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Corporate Strategy and National Institutions:
The Case of the Man-Made Fibres Industry
Geoffrey Owen
Abstract
This article discusses the impact of national policies and institutions on the strategies that
companies adopt when they are faced with disruptive changes in their external environment. The
article focuses on the man-made fibres industry in the U.S., Western Europe and Japan between
1980 and 2010 and describes the different ways in which the leading fibre manufacturers in those
regions responded to the shift in textile, clothing and later fibre production to low-cost countries,
principally in Asia. These companies had to decide whether they could continue to compete
profitably in the man-made fibres industry, and, if not, what non-fibre businesses they should
invest in. In countries such as the U.S. and the UK, where capital markets are powerful and
companies are under pressure to enhance shareholder value, virtually all the former leaders have
withdrawn from the industry and a set of new entrants, including private equity firms, have taken
their place. In Japan, by contrast, leading companies such as Toray and Teijin remain committed
to man-made fibres, although they have also diversified in other directions. Despite the increasing
role of Anglo-American investors in Japan, Japanese companies see themselves as responsible to a
broad range of stakeholders, not just to shareholders; the continuity of the enterprise and of
employment is given a higher priority than in the U.S. or the UK. In Continental Europe, the
restructuring of the man-made fibres industry has involved numerous divestments and demergers,
and this partly reflects the growing influence of Anglo-American investors, but in some of these
countries the stakeholder view of the enterprise continues to carry considerable weight. Lenzing in
Austria, which is now the largest European man-made fibre manufacturer, is an example of a
company which has combined commercial success with a strong sense of responsibility to the
region where its main factory is based. In reviewing these different strategies the article shows
how Japanese-style “long-termism” can be a source of strength in certain industries such as carbon
fibre, but has the disadvantage of allowing companies to persist for too long with low-return
businesses which might do a better under different owners. Some further movement towards the
Anglo-American model is likely in Japan and in Continental Europe, but these countries have a
different view of what companies are for, and this will continue to affect how their companies
respond to industrial change.
Author Notes: This article draws on the author’s recently published book, The Rise and Fall of
Great Companies: Courtaulds and the Reshaping of the Man-Made Fibres Industry, Pasold
Research Fund/Oxford University Press (2010). In preparing this article, I have benefited from
advice from Elie Cohen, Jan Eijsbouts, Bob Hancké, Markus Höllerer, Frank Horn and Colin
Purvis.
 1. Introduction   
 
Most large industrial companies, at some point in their lives, go through periods 
of turbulence which force them to change direction, acquire new skills and 
perhaps abandon businesses that they have relied on for many years. These crises 
can arise from a variety of causes: the appearance of a new competitor with an 
unbeatable cost advantage; a technological advance that makes obsolete the 
company’s existing products or manufacturing methods; a change in government 
policy which alters the dynamics of competition in the industry. 
How companies handle disruptive changes of this kind depends partly on 
their earlier history – their inherited skills and capabilities, their mix of businesses, 
their culture and management style – and on the actions taken by the executives 
who happen to be in charge at the time. If they make the right choices about 
which new businesses to go into and manage them well, the company may be able 
to navigate its way through the crisis and emerge intact. But management is only 
part of the story. The strategies that companies adopt in these situations, and the 
outcomes of these strategies, are shaped by the national environments in which 
the companies are based.  
Some countries have policies and institutions that facilitate the rapid 
transfer of resources from one set of owners to another; often a wave of 
divestments and acquisitions transforms the structure of the industry as a 
consequence of an external shock. Others put a higher premium on continuity. In 
these countries managers of large companies, especially ones that have existed for 
a long time, feel a sense of obligation to current and future employees, and to 
customers and local communities, to hold on to loss-making businesses and to 
nurse them back to health. Unless forced to do so by the prospect of imminent 
disaster, they have no wish to sell or close long-established divisions, still less to 
see the whole company taken over and broken up.1   
The principal exemplars of the first approach are the US and the UK. 
These countries share several characteristics, including a shareholder-based 
approach to corporate governance, an active takeover market, and weak trade 
unions. In the second group are Japan and some European countries which have 
stakeholder- rather than shareholder-oriented governance systems. Here the stock 
market plays a smaller role, hostile takeovers are rare and employees have the 
power to influence management decisions. Some of these countries, such as 
Austria, Germany and the Netherlands, have a corporatist tradition — a 
                                                
1 This classification broadly corresponds to the distinction between liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies, as set out in Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (eds), Varieties of 
capitalism, Oxford 2001. See also Ronald Dore, Stock market capitalism: welfare capitalism, 
Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons, Oxford 2000.  
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 commitment to partnership between labour, business and the state — that 
encourages consensual decision-making both at the national level and in firms.   
France and Italy fall outside this two-group classification. In France the 
influence of the state on the structure and ownership of industry has been much 
greater than in Germany. The trade unions are also weaker and there is no 
tradition of social partnership. Italy has a preponderance of family-owned firms, 
an under-developed stock market and, for much of the post-war period, an 
intrusive and often erratic role for the state. Some of the distinguishing features of 
these countries are set out in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Institutional differences among some OECD countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) This corporatism index was created by scoring each country between 0 and 1 on seven 
measures of economic cooperation, including business centralisation, wage-setting coordination, 
and cooperation between labour and management. Source: Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, 
Political power and corporate control, the new global politics of corporate governance, Princeton 
2005:154  
b) Source: IMF International Financial Statistics  
  
Globalisation has eroded some of these differences. As Anglo-American 
investors have become more active in Continental Europe and Japan, managers in 
these countries now give more weight to the impact of their decisions on 
shareholder value. But convergence has been only partial. National business 
systems  - the set of institutions and norms which govern relations between users 
and providers of capital, between employers and employees and between the state 
and business 2 - have deep historical roots, and they continue to constrain what 
firms do at times of crisis. This is not to say that companies are the prisoners of 
their environment. Powerful individuals can sometimes drive through changes 
                                                
2 This definition is based on Richard Whitley, Divergent capitalisms, the social structuring and 
change of business systems, Oxford 1999. 
 Corporatism 
ranking (a) 
Stock market 
as % of GDP 
 in 1995 (b)  
Stock market 
as % of GDP 
 in 2005 (b) 
Austria 0.960 14 41 
Germany 0.795 24 44 
Japan 0.774 70 104 
Netherlands 0.578 89 93 
Italy 0.439 17 45 
France 0.395 33 82 
UK 0.096 124 134 
US 0.023 92 134 
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 that run counter to prevailing views in their country about how companies should 
behave. Moreover, managers can make mistakes or have bad luck; the 
misfortunes of their companies may have little to do with the country in which 
they are based. The balance between company-specific and country-specific 
factors varies from case to case.  
 
2. The man-made fibres industry 
   
To illustrate the link between corporate strategy and national institutions this 
article examines an industry that has experienced an exceptional degree of 
turbulence in recent years: the man-made fibres industry. In the 1950s and 1960s 
fibre manufacturers in the advanced industrial countries enjoyed booming demand 
as nylon, polyester and acrylic fibre increased their share of the textile market at 
the expense of cotton and wool. During the 1970s the rate of substitution of man-
made for natural fibres slowed down. At the same time the textile industry, the 
main outlet for fibres, was shifting to low-wage countries, principally in Asia. 
These problems were compounded by the slowdown in the world economy that 
followed the increase in oil prices in 1973-74. The result was a crisis of over-
capacity in man-made fibres, especially severe in Europe, which prompted several 
companies to reduce their stake in the industry.  
Meanwhile several of the textile-exporting countries, including South 
Korea and Taiwan, and later China on a much bigger scale, began to invest in 
their own fibre plants. Today more than three quarters of the world’s fibre-making 
capacity is located in Asia, with China by far the largest producer. The bulk of 
China’s capacity is in polyester fibre, which has become the most important of the 
man-made fibres (Table 2). Some of the companies based in these countries, and 
in other emerging markets such as Turkey and Mexico, have become international 
players in the man-made fibres industry, both through exports from their domestic 
factories and by building or acquiring plants overseas.   
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  Table 2. World man-made fibre production share by region and by fibre in 
1988 and 2008 
 
 By region   
 
 1988 (%) 2008 (%) 
North America 22 8 
Western Europe 21 9 
Eastern Europe 15 2 
Asia 36 77 
Others 6 4 
 
  By fibre 
 
 1988 (%) 2008 (%) 
Polyester 41 69 
Nylon 19 8 
Acrylic 12 4 
Olefin 13 13 
Cellulosics 15 6 
 
Source: Fiber Economics Bureau, Division of AFMA 
 
The man-made fibres industry in high-wage countries did not disappear, 
since there were some end-uses, principally outside clothing, which were less 
exposed to Asian competition. Manufacturers had to decide whether, by focusing 
on these markets or by developing unique technology that Asian producers could 
not match, they could maintain a profitable fibres business. The alternative was to 
pull out, in which case they had to decide how and when to do so, and what non-
fibre businesses to invest in.  
Companies responded in different ways, and with very different results. 
Most of the fifteen firms listed in Table 3 have been drastically reshaped. Some of 
them, such as Courtaulds in Britain, once the world leader in man-made fibres, no 
longer exist. Only three — Lenzing in Austria and two of the three Japanese 
companies — are still making fibres on a large scale. This article looks first at the 
history of the industry up to the end of the 1970s, and then at the changes that 
took place over the following three decades in the US, Japan and Western Europe. 
The concluding section assesses the role of national policies and institutions in 
shaping responses to industrial change 
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 Table 3. Leading man-made fibre producers in 1978, and their status in 2010  
 
Leading producers                  Status in 2010 
In 1978 
 
US 
 
Celanese               Acquired by Hoechst in 1987, demerged in 
         1999, independent company 
DuPont                Independent company  
Monsanto                                 Independent company 
 
Western Europe 
 
Akzo        Re-named Akzo Nobel after merger with Nobel  
       Industries in 1994, independent company  
Bayer                Independent company 
Courtaulds      Taken over by Akzo Nobel in 1998 
Hoechst      Merged with Rhône-Poulenc to form Aventis in  
              1998; Aventis was subsequently acquired by  
             Sanofi 
ICI         Taken over by Akzo Nobel in 2007 
Lenzing               Independent company 
Montedison              Part taken over by ENI in 1990; rest of the  
        company broken up during the 1990s   
Rhône-Poulenc         Merged with Hoechst in 1998 to form Aventis;  
      chemicals and fibres businesses demerged as Rhodia 
Snia Viscosa            Renamed Snia BPD, then Snia, entered bankruptcy 
  proceedings in 2010  
 
Japan 
 
Asahi Kasei                 Independent company   
Teijin                 Independent company 
Toray                 Independent company 
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 3. The evolution of the industry up to the end of the 1970s 
 
The man-made fibres industry was born at the end of the 19th century when a 
French inventor found a way of converting cellulose, extracted from woodpulp, 
into artificial silk; this fibre was later given the more attractive name of rayon. 
The best of three competing processes for making artificial silk was the viscose 
process, developed in Europe and adopted later in the US and Japan. Rayon (or 
viscose – the two terms can be used interchangeably) was initially produced in 
filament form and processed in the same way as silk. During the 1920s the 
manufacturers began to produce rayon staple as a substitute for cotton, and this 
opened up a much bigger market. Another cellulosic fibre introduced during this 
period was acetate yarn, which was superior to rayon in some applications and 
used in finer fabrics.3   
By 1939 a substantial industry had taken shape, based almost entirely on 
cellulosic fibres. By that time DuPont had invented nylon, the first of the 
synthetic fibres – so called because, unlike rayon, which was based on woodpulp, 
nylon was synthesised by a series of chemical processes out of coal, water and air. 
(Oil later displaced coal as the starting raw material.) By 1945 polyester and 
acrylic fibre were under development. The industry was about to enter a period of 
spectacular growth as the advantages of synthetic fibres over cotton and wool, 
especially their easy-care properties, became more widely appreciated. Demand 
for rayon (a cellulosic fibre with some cotton-like properties, notably absorbency, 
that the synthetics could not match), continued to increase up to the end of the 
1970s, but at a slower rate. 
  In Europe and the US the industry was made up of two groups of 
companies. One comprised firms such as Courtaulds in Britain, AKU (later Akzo) 
in the Netherlands and Celanese in the US, which had been early leaders in 
cellulosic fibres. Most of them added synthetics to their range after the Second 
World War. The other consisted of diversified chemical companies such as ICI 
and Hoechst in Europe, and DuPont and Monsanto in the US, which focused 
mainly on synthetics. (DuPont was exceptional in the latter group in having been 
an early entrant in rayon.) These chemical companies generally handled all stages 
of the process, making intermediate chemicals as well as extruding the polymer 
into fibre. 4  The ex-rayon firms mostly bought intermediates from outside 
suppliers   
                                                
3 The acetate process was later used to produce acetate tow, which came to be widely used after 
the Second World War as the filter material in filter-tipped cigarettes.  
4  The manufacturing process in synthetic fibres begins with the production of intermediate 
chemicals, from which the polymer is produced; the polymer is then extruded into fibre. In the 
case of polyester, the key intermediate chemicals are purified terephthalic acid (PTA) and mono 
ethylene glycol (MEG), out of which the polymer, polyethylene terephthalate (PET), is produced.   
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 In Japan the big chemical groups did not diversify as widely as their 
counterparts in the West after World War II, and the man-made fibres industry 
remained in the hands of the rayon producers. All of them were eager to get into 
synthetics, and they did so on the basis of a “staggered entry” formula devised by 
the Japanese government to prevent over-investment.5 Thus Toray was allowed to 
negotiate a nylon licence from DuPont in 1951, and a second nylon entrant, 
Nippon Rayon, was set up in 1954. These two companies had the market to 
themselves for nearly a decade, before Teijin and Asahi Kasei joined in. In 1958 
Toray and Teijin jointly negotiated a polyester licence from ICI, and they 
controlled the market for six years before others were allowed to enter the market. 
At the end of the 1970s, as Table 4 shows, the leading companies varied in 
the mix of fibres they produced and in the extent of their dependence on fibres. 
The question for all of them, as the post-war boom came to an end, was whether 
they should continue to invest in fibres or divert resources into other areas. Some 
of them, including Lenzing and the three Japanese firms, were too dependent on 
fibres to contemplate withdrawal. The multi-product chemical groups had more 
options because of their many other businesses, but that did not necessarily make 
their task easier. The whole chemical industry (with the exception of 
pharmaceuticals) had entered a period of maturity.6 Not only fibres, but other 
products such as plastics which had driven the industry’s growth in the earlier 
post-war decades had acquired the status of commodities, subject to bouts of 
over-capacity and fierce price-cutting. The chemical companies, finding 
themselves with too many slow-growing businesses, had to decide which of them 
justified further investment, and which should be closed down or sold. What to do 
about fibres was one of several portfolio issues that had to be resolved.  
                                                
5 Terutomo Ozawa, Government control over technology acquisition and firms’ entry into new 
sectors: the experience of Japan’s synthetic fibre industry, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 4 
(1980):133-146. 
6 Ashish Arora and Alfonso Gambardella, Evolution of industry structure in the chemical industry, 
in Ashish Arora, Ralph Landau and Nathan Rosenberg (eds), Chemicals and long-term economic 
growth, John Wiley 1998.  
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  Table 4. Estimated output of leading man-made fibre companies in 1978  
 
Company Output 
(000 
tonnes) 
Composition of output (%) % of 
total 
sales 
from 
fibres 
Rayon/ 
Acetate 
Nylon Polyester Acrylic 
DuPont 1840 1 31 60 8 33 
Akzo 660 42 29 27 2 37 
Toray 545  36 49 16 75 
Courtaulds 541 62 6 5 27 47 
Rhône  
431 22 34 34 10 16 Poulenc 
Celanese 418 24 12 64 - 57 
Monsanto 416  51 16 33 16 
Teijin 404 2 11 87 - 70 
Hoechst 336 16 1 68 16 8 
Asahi 
Kasei 272 13 21 2 64 44 
ICI 240 - 40 60 - 8 
Snia 
Viscosa 212 40 32 7 21 50 
Montedison 189 12 16 22 50 18 
Bayer 160 - 22 16 62 4 
Lenzing 115 90 - - 10 74 
               
Sources: These figures are estimates drawn partly from T.A.J. Cockerill, The 
man-made fibres industry: international comparisons of structure, conduct and 
performance, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Manchester 1985 (Tables 
3.9 and 9.10),and partly from industry sources. 
 
4. The US 
 
In the US, the maturing of the man-made fibres industry in the 1970s and 1980s 
coincided with a change in the character of the financial system and in the 
relationship between companies and their investors. In the earlier post-war 
decades the ownership of most listed companies was spread across a large number 
of investors, mostly private individuals who had neither the power nor the 
incentive to influence the management of the firms in which they held shares. 
This was the era of managerial capitalism, in which senior executives had wide 
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 discretion in deciding how to allocate their company’s resources; some of them 
built large, unwieldy empires without much regard to the interests of shareholders. 
By the end of the 1970s the ownership structure had changed. Financial 
institutions now held a larger proportion of the shares, and some took a close 
interest in the management of the firms in which they invested. The 1980s also 
saw a wave of financial innovation, notably the leveraged buy-out (LBO), a 
technique by which financial entrepreneurs, later known as private equity firms, 
used large amounts of debt to acquire the unwanted subsidiaries of diversified 
corporations. As private equity firms acquired greater experience, they acquired 
entire companies in the same way.7   
With powerful shareholders pressing for higher returns, managerial 
capitalism was giving way to investor capitalism; shareholder value came to be 
seen as the principal measure of corporate performance. Some of this shareholder 
activism was directed at companies that had diversified too widely; they were 
criticised for destroying shareholder value by propping up bad businesses out of 
profits made in the good ones. A new group of financial predators emerged during 
this period, who saw that there was money to be made by breaking up badly 
managed conglomerates and either selling the component parts or floating them 
on the stock market as independent firms. Unless diversified companies could 
demonstrate that they were adding value to the businesses they owned, they were 
likely to become takeover targets.   
These changes had a profound effect on the man-made fibres industry, 
most of which was in the hands of large, diversified chemical companies. 
Although these companies had not generally strayed outside chemicals, they had a 
mixed bag of low-return and high-return businesses, and if they were to meet the 
expectations of shareholders they needed to be more selective in what they did. 
This often involved the sale of unwanted subsidiaries to outside investors, 
including private equity firms; leveraged buy-outs played a large role in the 
restructuring of the US chemical industry during the 1980s and 1990s.8 Another 
option was to demerge the subsidiary and to list it on the stock market as an 
independent company. In the case of fibres, the effect of these transactions was to 
transfer virtually all the industry’s capacity from the former incumbents into the 
hands of a new set of players.  
The largest of the incumbents, and the unquestioned leader of the industry, 
was DuPont. Having achieved its great triumph with nylon, it went on to launch 
an acrylic fibre, Orlon, in 1950 and Dacron, a polyester fibre, in 1953.  Another 
                                                
7 The most celebrated of these acquisitions was KKR’s acquisition of RJR Nabisco for $31 billion 
in 1989. See George P, Baker and George David Smith, The new financial capitalists, Kohlberg 
Kravis Roberts and the creation of corporate value, Cambridge 1998. 
8 Sarah J. Lane, Corporate restructuring in the chemicals industry, in Margaret M Blair (ed) The 
deal decade, Brookings 1993.  
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 success was Lycra, an elastomeric or spandex fibre made out of polyurethane, 
which had outstanding stretch and recovery properties.9 Other more specialised 
fibres, such as Kevlar, a high-strength aramid fibre used for bullet-proof vests and 
a variety of industrial applications, came out of DuPont’s laboratories a few years 
later.10 During the early 1950s, when sales of nylon were growing fast, the Textile 
Fibers Department generated about half of the company’s profits, and it was still a 
big contributor – about 30-40 per cent of total profits – in the early 1970s.11  
Over the next few years the fibres market slowed down and new sources 
of growth were needed. Edward Jefferson, a DuPont veteran who became chief 
executive in 1981 (he had joined the company as a research chemist thirty years 
earlier), believed that the life sciences could give DuPont the same sort of boost 
that polymer science had provided in the 1940s and 1950s.12  What followed was 
a series of acquisitions, divestments and new ventures as the company sought to 
make itself less dependent on fibres and more attractive to investors.  
The biggest acquisition was that of an oil company, Conoco, giving 
DuPont a big stake in petrochemicals on which many of its other businesses 
depended. But the best growth opportunities were thought to lie downstream, in 
areas where DuPont could gain a competitive edge through science and 
technology. It made several small acquisitions in pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemicals, formed an alliance with Merck, and stepped up its research in the 
life sciences. Yet the company seemed to lack a sure touch in reshaping its 
portfolio. At a time when investors were pressing companies to focus on their 
strongest businesses, DuPont was criticised for sticking too long with low-return, 
commodity products. The first move to reduce its involvement in fibres came in 
1990, when it stopped making Orlon, the least profitable of its synthetic fibres. 
Polyester was also suffering from the continuing decline of the US textile industry 
and the build-up of capacity in Asia. In a partial exit from this sector DuPont put 
several of its US polyester plants into joint ventures with other companies, two of 
which, Alpek in Mexico and Sabanci in Turkey, were based in emerging markets, 
a sign of the changing balance of power in the world man-made fibres industry. 
The non-American partners later bought full control of these plants.  
DuPont still saw a good future for nylon, especially carpet fibre where it 
had strong upstream technology and well-established brands (carpets were also 
much less vulnerable to import competition than clothing), and for Lycra, where it 
                                                
9 This type of fibre is designated ‘spandex’ in the US, ‘elastane’ in Europe.  
10 DuPont introduced improved versions of nylon, including Bulked Continuous Filament (BCF) 
for tufted carpets which was launched in 1958. DuPont also pioneered the development of spun-
bonded or non-woven products, which became an important part of the man-made fibres industry.   
11 David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith Jr, Science and corporate strategy, Du Pont R & D, 
1902-1980, Cambridge 1988: 425. 
12 Hounshell and Kenly Smith, Science and corporate strategy: 507. 
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 had a commanding market position. In 1992 DuPont increased its commitment to 
nylon when it bought ICI’s European nylon business. But the apparel market 
became increasingly difficult in the course of the decade and by the turn of the 
century DuPont’s managers had recognised – belatedly in the view of some 
observers – that withdrawal from commodity fibres was unavoidable.  
In 2002, Chad Holliday, the chief executive, announced that the nylon, 
polyester and spandex plants, which had been put into a free-standing subsidiary, 
DuPont Textiles and Interiors (later renamed Invista), would be divested, either 
through a demerger or a trade sale. Two years later, after discussions with several 
other possible buyers, DuPont sold Invista to Koch Industries, a private US 
company owned by the Koch family, for $4.4bn. Charles Koch, head of the 
company, believed that by squeezing costs out of the business, and without the 
overheads of a large research-based corporation, he could make a good return in 
commodity fibres. The sale did not include DuPont’s aramid fibres, Kevlar and 
Nomex, which were protected by patents and not yet exposed to Asian 
competition.  
 This was part of an extensive reshuffling of assets that took place during 
Holliday’s tenure as chief executive. In addition to the disposal of fibres, he also 
demerged Conoco and withdrew from pharmaceuticals.13 Although DuPont had 
had some success in its pharmaceutical research, it lacked the scale of the leading 
companies such as Merck and Pfizer. The involvement in life sciences continued, 
but the focus shifted towards agrochemicals; DuPont bought a leading hybrid seed 
producer, Pioneer Hi-Bred, in 1999, and briefly considered a merger with 
Monsanto, which had become a specialist in agrochemicals.  
At the time of Holliday’s retirement DuPont was still a diversified group, 
with a collection of businesses, including paints and advanced materials, some of 
which did not obviously benefit from being part of the same organisation. One 
commentator complained that Holliday “had swerved into buying and selling 
businesses as if he had a compass in his hand that pointed every direction except 
where DuPont had been”.14 Another described the 1997-2007 period as DuPont’s 
“lost decade”, and suggested that shareholders would have done better if the 
company had been broken up.15 Despite these criticisms, DuPont’s performance 
was never so poor as to provoke a hostile bid. Successive managers may have 
been reluctant to withdraw from a business that had been at the heart of the 
company for so long.  
Monsanto was less dependent on fibres than DuPont, but it, too, had a 
wide range of chemical businesses, upstream as well as downstream. During the 
1970s it sought to enlarge its stake in speciality chemicals, and this strategy was 
                                                
13 DuPont’s pharmaceutical business was sold to Bristol-Myers Squibb in 2001 for $7.8 billion. 
14 Fortune, April 15, 2010. 
15 ICIS Chemical Business July 17 2008. 
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 taken further when Richard Mahoney became chief executive in 1984. A 
visionary and ambitious manager, Mahoney resolved to refocus the company on 
the life sciences. Monsanto already had a strong position in pesticides – its biggest 
sellers were Lasso and Roundup - and this was the starting-point for a major 
investment in research and in acquisitions. “The company aggressively pursued R 
& D efforts in plant biology, hiring prominent academics, forming its own 
biotechnology subsidiary, and acquiring stakes in biotechnology start-ups”. 16 
Mahoney sold off some of the older chemical businesses, and bought a medium-
sized pharmaceutical company, G. D. Searle. By the early 1990s Monsanto 
derived more than half its revenues from agricultural and health care products.  
 In 1997, Robert Shapiro, Mahoney’s successor, took the logical step of 
hiving off what was left of chemicals and fibres into a separate company, Solutia. 
Investors praised the demerger and Shapiro was briefly a stock market hero, but 
subsequent acquisitions over-stretched Monsanto’s finances. It had some 
promising drugs in the pipeline, but investors questioned whether the company 
had the financial strength to hold its own against bigger pharmaceutical firms. In 
1998 Monsanto came close to joining forces with American Home Products, but 
that deal fell through and two years later it merged with another pharmaceutical 
company, Pharmacia & Upjohn, which Pfizer acquired in 2002. The agrochemical 
business was put into a separate subsidiary, given the Monsanto name, and spun 
off as an independent company. After a shaky start, and despite opposition in 
some countries to the use of genetically modified organisms in agriculture, the 
new Monsanto established itself as a world leader in seeds and agrochemicals. 
Hugh Grant, who was appointed chief executive in 2003, described the company 
as “a vibrant biotechnology company with all the dynamism of a Silicon Valley 
start-up”.17  
Celanese, the third largest of the US companies listed in Table 3, has also 
gone through wrenching changes over the last thirty years. This company, set up 
in the 1920s as a manufacturer of cellulose acetate, had moved into synthetics, 
principally polyester, after the second world war; it also extended its range into 
engineering plastics and other chemicals. Celanese had several joint ventures with 
Hoechst, and when the German company was looking for a way of expanding its 
presence in the US, it identified Celanese as an acquisition target. An agreed 
merger was negotiated in 1987, but antitrust authorities challenged it on the 
grounds that the merged group would have too large a share of the polyester 
                                                
16  Alfred D. Chandler, Takashi Hikino and David C. Mowery, The evolution of corporate 
capabilities and corporate structure within the world’s largest chemical firms: the twentieth 
century perspective, in Arora et al (eds), Chemicals and long-term economic growth. See also 
Nitin Nohria, Davis Dyer and Frederick Dalzell, Changing fortunes, remaking the industrial 
corporation, John Wiley 2002:85-95. 
17 Financial Times, June 15 2009. 
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 market; Hoechst was already making polyester at its own plant in Spartanburg, 
South Carolina. To win approval for the merger Hoechst sold two Celanese plants 
to an investment group led by Gordon Cain, a former manager in Continental Oil 
who had made a name for himself as a pioneer in leveraged buy-outs. (Two years 
later Cain sold the ex-Celanese polyester business to another American company, 
Wellman, which up to that time had been primarily a recycler of waste fibres.18)  
After the sale to Cain, Hoechst remained a major player in fibres, as well 
as having, through Celanese, a sizeable stake in other branches of the US 
chemical industry. In the mid-1990s, however, for reasons described later in this 
article, the German company went through a radical overhaul, the outcome of 
which was to focus the group entirely on the life sciences. All its other businesses, 
including fibres, were divested, either through demerger or sale. The US polyester 
plants were sold to a consortium called KoSa, formed by Koch Industries and a 
Mexican company controlled by Isaac Saba. Koch later bought out its Mexican 
partner. Celanese, which by then had become a chemicals rather than a fibres 
company, was demerged in 199919.  
These transactions – the DuPont sale to Koch, the Monsanto demerger, 
Hoechst’s exit from fibres – were part of a broader restructuring process which 
saw virtually all the multi-product chemical companies withdraw from the man-
made fibres industry.20 Some of the newcomers were private equity firms, which 
believed that by buying fibre plants from the diversified groups and running them 
more efficiently they could make a good return for their investors. Sun Capital 
Partners, for example, bought a polyester business, Performance Fibers, from 
Allied Signal and went on to acquire other plants in the US and overseas; it 
became one of the leading world producers of polyester industrial yarn.21 Sun 
Capital Partners has done well in the fibres business, as have several other private 
equity firms.22  
                                                
18 Gordon Cain, Everyone wins! A life in free enterprise, Chemical Heritage Press, Philadelphia, 
2001:234-5. 
19 Celanese continued to make acetate yarn and acetate tow after the demerger. It remained on the 
stock market until 2004 when it was taken private by the Blackstone Group, a private equity firm; 
a year later it was brought back to the stock market, generating a large profit for Blackstone.   
20 DuPont continued to manufacture its aramid fibres, Kevlar and Nomex. Honeywell (formerly 
Allied Signal) sold its commodity fibres, but retained its Spectra high-strength fibre.  
21 Allied Signal, part of Honeywell, was the descendant of Allied Chemical, which had been one 
of the leaders in the US man-made fibres industry in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1990s it began to 
divest its fibre-making assets. Its nylon carpet fibre operations were sold to Shaw Industries, a 
carpet manufacturer. 
22 Other private equity firms which have been active in the sector include Sterling Group, which 
bought Universal Fiber Systems, a manufacturer of nylon and polyester, in 2007, and SK Capital 
Partners, which bought Solutia’s nylon business in 2009; that business now operates as Ascend 
Performance Materials.  
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 Other new entrants were foreign companies seeking to establish 
themselves in the US. In 2010 two of the largest man-made fibre manufacturers in 
the US were DAK Americas, owned by Alpek in Mexico, and Kordsa, controlled 
by Sabanci in Turkey; both had started as joint ventures with DuPont.  Another 
Asian group, Nan Ya from Taiwan, a subsidiary of Formosa Chemicals and Fibre 
Corporation, had entered the US market directly by building a polyester plant in 
South Carolina. In 2009 Indorama, a company based in Thailand but with 
operations in other Asian countries, bought two of Invista’s polyester plants, 
including the ex-Hoechst factory at Spartanburg.  
Not all of the newcomers or newly formed companies were successful. 
Solutia, for example, struggled for some years after the spin-off from Monsanto 
and filed for bankruptcy in 2007. It came out of bankruptcy in 2009 and is now a 
speciality chemical company with no involvement in fibres. Wellman also had a 
spell in bankruptcy and has largely withdrawn from fibres.23  Casualties were 
inevitable in a contracting industry, especially among firms supplying the apparel 
market. As Table 5 shows, the decline in apparel fibre was partially offset by the 
continuing strength of demand in carpets and in industrial end-uses, and these 
were the two sectors on which merchant producers such as Invista and 
Performance Fibers mostly concentrated, although in the case of carpets an 
increasing proportion of the industry’s capacity was taken over by the carpet 
manufacturers themselves; there were cost advantages in integrating fibre and 
carpet production. 
The US government played no role in the restructuring of the industry, 
except to enforce the antitrust laws. In the early post-war years the antitrust 
authorities took steps to ensure that DuPont’s first mover advantage did not allow 
it to dominate the market; the threat of antitrust action prompted DuPont to 
license its nylon technology to Chemstrand, the Monsanto affiliate, in 1951. 
DuPont was also required to break up its long-standing technical agreement with 
ICI, freeing the British company to invade the US market; in 1959 it formed a 
joint polyester venture with Celanese. 24  (DuPont also built several plants in 
Europe.) As noted earlier, the Federal Trade Commission intervened in the 
Hoechst/Celanese merger, and the effect was to establish a new competitor in 
polyester fibre. An active competition policy, together with the absence of 
barriers to inward investment, reinforced the pressure on the industry coming 
from both the marketplace and investors.  
 
                                                
23 Wellman continues to make PET packaging resin in the US. In 2007 it sold its European 
recycled fibres business, including the Fortrel brand, to Aurelius, a Munich-based private equity 
firm.  
24 ICI sold its share in this venture in 1981. 
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 Table 5. US shipments of man-made fibres in 1990 and 2006 
 
  1990 2006 
  ’000 tons % ’000 tons % 
Apparel 930.7 26.8 330.8 10.8 
Carpet face fibre 1,097.2 31.6 1,437.9 47.1 
Home Textile 345.9 10.0 155.1 5.1 
Industrial 1,101.6 31.7 1,131.3 37.0 
         
Totals 3,475.4 100.0 3,055.1 100.0 
Source: Fiber Economics Bureau, Division of AFMA  
 
5. Japan 
 
The adjustment that took place in the Japanese man-made fibres industry after 
1980 could hardly have been more different from that of the US. There were no 
new entrants, little foreign investment and none of the corporate break-ups that 
took place in the US. In 2010 the industry was still in the hands of the same 
companies that had dominated the industry in the early post-war years; most of 
them had their origins in the inter-war period or earlier (Table 6).  
 
Table 6. Leading Japanese man-made fibre makers in 2010 
 
Company    Original product line  Principal fibres produced 
(founding date in       in 2010 
brackets) 
 
Toray (1926)   Rayon     nylon, polyester, acrylic 
Asahi Kasei (1922) Rayon    nylon, spandex, cupra 
Teijin (1918)   Rayon     polyester, aramid  
Toyobo (1882)  Cotton yarn    nylon, polyester 
Kuraray (1926) Rayon     polyester, vinylon 
Unitika (1969*)   Cotton yarn/rayon   nylon, polyester 
Mitsubishi Rayon (1933)  Rayon    acrylic, polyester, acetate  
   
*Unitika was formed in 1969 by a merger between Nichibo and Nippon Rayon; the latter had 
started rayon production in 1926 
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 In Japan the company has traditionally been seen as a community which 
exists for the benefit of all its stakeholders - employees, suppliers and customers 
as well as shareholders. Except at times of crisis, Japanese investors did not force 
companies to sell off or close down low-profit businesses. Partly for this reason 
the rationalisation of the Japanese man-made fibres industry took place more 
slowly, and over a longer period, than in the US. The three leading producers, 
Toray, Teijin and Asahi Kasei, never considered withdrawing from fibres even 
when returns were low or non-existent. They regarded it as a “foundation 
business” which defined their identity as companies. It was also a source of 
technology on which other businesses could be built. 
The structure of the Japanese industry was also influenced by the keiretsu 
system that was widely adopted after the Second World War. The keiretsu was a 
group of companies that were linked to each other through cross-shareholdings, 
usually with a “main bank” at the centre. They were mostly put together in the 
1950s as a form of protection against take-overs; the cross-shareholdings, though 
individually small, together amounted to a large enough block to obstruct any 
possible bidder. 25  As members of the same family keiretsu firms were also 
discouraged from trespassing into another member’s territory. The chemical 
companies within a particular keiretsu found that when they tried to enter a new 
product area, another member of the group was operating there. Thus the 
petrochemical companies within the Mitsubishi and Mitsui groups could not 
integrate vertically into synthetic fibres because Mitsubishi Rayon and Toray (a 
member of the Mitsui group) were already established in that industry.26 There 
were supply links between chemical and fibre companies but ownership and 
management were kept separate.  
As Table 4 showed, the leading Japanese companies, especially Toray and 
Teijin, were more dependent on fibres than most of their Western counterparts at 
the end of the 1970s. Although they had begun to diversify, their core business 
was fibres, and they were determined to keep it viable in the face of what had 
become a very difficult environment. The domestic textile industry was declining 
fast in the face of rising imports, and international competition in fibres was 
increasing as newly industrialising countries, especially Taiwan and South Korea, 
built up their fibre-making capacity.  
For Toray, the largest producer, the key to competitiveness was 
technology. The most important of its fibres was polyester and its researchers 
looked for ways of adding functional properties both for apparel and for industrial 
                                                
25  Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, Banks and corporate control in Japan, Journal of 
Finance, 1989, 54 (1): 319-339. 
26  Takashi Hikino, Tsutomo Harada, Yoshio Tokuhisa and James A. Yoshida, The Japanese 
puzzle: rapid catch-up and long struggle, in Arora et al, (eds), Chemicals and long-term economic 
growth:117. 
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 uses. A notable success was a silk-like version of polyester called Sillook 
(Silkijoy for export), a lightweight material that could replace silk, not just in 
stockings as nylon had done, but in a wider range of apparel including kimonos. 
First marketed in the mid-1960s, it became a profitable part of Toray’s polyester 
division. Toray also launched a polyester-based suede material known as Ecsaine, 
aimed at the fashion industry in the West.  At the same time it established a 
network of fibre plants in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, partly to supply local 
textile mills, partly as a base for export. Through a partnership with a Hong Kong-
based firm it formed links with spinning, weaving and knitting companies 
throughout East Asia. The network was extended in the mid-1990s with the 
construction of a polyester plant at Nantong in China. Although textile and 
clothing production in Japan was decreasing, Toray still saw textiles as a growth 
industry in international terms.  
 The second strand in Toray’s strategy was diversification. This had begun 
in the 1960s with plastics and film, closely related through polymer science to 
fibres. Polyester film was used as the base material for audio and video tape, 
linking Toray to Japan’s powerful electronics industry. Another non-textile 
business, carbon fibre, was started in the late 1960s, and Toray later became a 
supplier to Boeing and other aircraft manufacturers.27 It also targeted the health 
care sector, starting with artificial kidneys and later making prescription drugs.28  
Diversification did not imply that fibres would be neglected, much less 
disposed of. Toray’s commitment to playing a role in all phases of the textile 
chain was underlined in 2006 by an agreement with a Japanese retailing group, 
Uniqlo, to create what was described as “a seamless product development system 
that unifies all the stages from material selection through final product sale.”29 In 
2010 Toray was one of the few companies still producing all three high-volume 
fibres, polyester, nylon and acrylic. It derived nearly 40 per cent of its sales from 
fibres and textiles, although this proportion was declining as more investment 
went into higher-growth businesses such as carbon fibre.  
Toray’s main rival in fibres through the post-war period has been Teijin. 
The two companies cooperated in some areas – for example, they jointly 
negotiated a polyester licence from ICI – but they were also fiercely independent. 
In contrast to ICI and Courtaulds in the UK (see below), there was never any 
question of a merger between them, still less of one taking over the other. A 
merger would only have made sense if it led to rationalisation and factory 
closures, and that was not acceptable in Japan.  
                                                
27 Carbon fibre, which uses acrylic fibre as the precursor, is the reinforcing agent in a lightweight, 
high-strength material used in sporting goods, the aerospace industry and a range of engineering 
applications. 
28 The History of Toray 1926-1996, Toray Industries, Tokyo, 1999: 181. 
29 Toray press release, 19 June 2006. 
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 Like Toray, Teijin started life as a rayon producer. It was a latecomer in 
nylon, and, partly for that reason, began to build up non-fibre businesses earlier 
than Toray had done. Some of these ventures were outside Teijin’s core skills and 
later abandoned. 30  But the pharmaceuticals business was successful. Teijin 
launched its first prescription drugs in 1980 and later started a home health care 
business, providing oxygen therapy for respiratory problems. Research continued 
in man-made fibres, leading to several new products including an aramid fibre, 
competing in the same market as DuPont’s Kevlar. But Teijin’s biggest business 
was polyester and profit margins here fell sharply in the 1990s as a result of the 
build-up of capacity in China.  
Shosaku Yasui, who was then chief executive, recognised that polyester, 
especially apparel fibre, would never regain its former levels of profitability, and 
that Teijin needed strong businesses in other sectors. He bought an aramid fibre 
business from Akzo Nobel in Europe, thus establishing Teijin as the principal 
rival to DuPont in this sector, and acquired a controlling interest in Toho Rayon, 
the second largest Japanese carbon fibre producer after Toray. These two 
businesses, along with pharmaceuticals and home health care, became the 
principal profit earners, but Teijin continued to battle on in polyester; thanks to 
rationalisation and cost reduction this business got back to a small profit in 2010. 
  Asahi  Kasei,  the  third  of  the  Japanese  firms  listed  in  Table  3, had closer 
links to the chemical industry than Toray and Teijin, but it regarded fibres as a 
“foundation business” and by the 1960s it was a full-line fibre manufacturer, 
making nylon, polyester and acrylic as well as cellulosic fibres; it later launched 
an elastane fibre, a competitor to DuPont’s Lycra. By 1990, although chemicals 
accounted for the bulk of Asahi’s sales, textile fibres were still an integral part of 
the group. Then came a combination of pressures – the stagnation of the Japanese 
economy, the continuing decline in the textile industry, and falling prices in the 
world fibre market – which necessitated a change of approach. Under a new 
policy of “selectivity and focus”, Asahi withdrew from nylon textile filament, cut 
back polyester, and abandoned rayon. An even more painful decision, in 2002, 
was to stop making acrylic fibre, which had been at the heart of its fibres division 
for nearly fifty years.  
In 2009 the president, Shiro Hiruta, told shareholders that Asahi Kasei had 
been transformed “from a fiber-centered operation to the diversified enterprise we 
are today”.31 Yet the fibres business was not abandoned, and Asahi Kasei was 
                                                
30  Teijin’s diversification strategy in the 1960s and 1970s was criticised by an American observer 
as an extreme example of the tendency for Japanese managers, supported by their banks and 
unconstrained by their investors, to expand their empires in ways that destroyed shareholder value. 
W. Carl Kester, Japanese takeovers, the global contest for corporate control, Harvard Business 
School Press, Boston, 1991: 232. 
31 Asahi Kasei 2009 Annual Report. 
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 prepared to increase its stake in sectors where it had a competitive advantage. In 
elastane fibre Asahi Kasei is now the main competitor to Invista’s Lycra, with 
plants in the US and Germany as well as in Asia.32 
The continuing commitment to fibres is one feature that distinguishes the 
Japanese companies from most of their American and European counterparts. 
Another is their conglomerate form. In 2010, even after the pruning that had taken 
place over the preceding decade, all three Japanese companies were still 
diversified and showed no inclination to narrow their focus, still less to break 
themselves up into smaller pieces. The rationale was explained by Shigeo Ohyagi 
of Teijin in his statement to shareholders in 2008: “There is a tendency to think 
that companies involved in only one industry have an easier time formulating 
clear-cut business strategies, but the truth of the matter is that many such 
companies are eventually swallowed up by the waves of technological innovation. 
Among the many virtues of the conglomerate business model is a greater essential 
ability to adapt flexibly to changes in the operating environment.”33  At the same 
time, he assured investors that Teijin set a profitability hurdle in all its businesses, 
“thereby demanding that each consistently demonstrates the value of its existence 
within the conglomerate.”  
This emphasis on meeting the expectations of shareholders stemmed in 
part from the growing influence of Anglo-American institutions, including hedge 
funds and private equity firms, as investors in Japanese companies.34 There had 
also been a partial unwinding of the cross-shareholdings that had previously 
insulated them from takeover.35 While this did not lead to hostile takeovers or US-
style break-ups, it was no longer acceptable for diversification to be used as an 
excuse for prolonging the life of unprofitable businesses. There was also a greater 
willingness to use mergers and acquisitions, overseas as well as inside Japan, as a 
means of reshaping their portfolios. To that extent the Japanese fibre companies, 
though still not as shareholder-oriented as their Western counterparts, had moved 
some way towards the Anglo-American model.   
 
                                                
32 Asahi Kasei also manufactures cuprammonium rayon (cupra) and nylon. 
33 Interview with Shigeo Ohyagi in the 2008 Teijin Annual Report.  
34 Christina L. Ahmedjian and Gregory E. Robbins, A clash of capitalisms: foreign shareholders 
and corporate restructuring in 1990s Japan, American Sociological Review, 70 (3), June 2005: 
451-471. See also Ulrike Schaede, Choose and focus, Japanese business strategies for the 21st 
century, Cornell, Ithaca, 2008. 
35 Hideaki Miyajima and Fumiaki Kuroki, The unwinding of cross-shareholding in Japan: causes, 
effects and implications, in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson and Hideaki Miyajima (eds), 
Corporate governance in Japan, Oxford 2007. 
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 6. Western Europe 
 
As in Japan and the US, the maturing of the industry in Western Europe first 
became evident in the 1970s, but the European situation was made worse by the 
overinvestment that had taken place in earlier years. Too many plants had been 
built in anticipation of continuing growth in demand (some of them, especially in 
Italy, had been financed by governments), and when the market collapsed after 
the increase in oil prices in 1973-74 virtually all the manufacturers were losing 
money. Some order was restored to the market through a Europe-wide 
rationalisation scheme, approved by the European Commission, which took effect 
in the early 1980s. 36   As part of the agreement companies were allowed to 
maintain or expand their capacity in fibres where their competitive position was 
strong, as long as they withdrew from the ones where they were weak. For 
example, Bayer gave up polyester to concentrate mainly on acrylic, where its 
Dralon brand was well established. ICI took the painful decision to stop making 
polyester, where it had been the European first-mover, but continued in nylon.  
By 1985 manufacturers were operating closer to full capacity, but it was 
clear that the fibres business would never return to the profitability of the earlier 
post-war decades. What followed, starting in the early 1990s, was a series of 
divestments and disposals that redrew the map of the industry (Tables 7 and 8). 
Of the ten leading fibre manufacturers at the start of the period, only Lenzing 
continues to exist in its old form. The other nine have been replaced by a new set 
of players that have very different styles and backgrounds than the industry’s 
former leaders. Some of them are based in Turkey, which has retained a sizeable 
textile and clothing industry and is the home of several large man-fibre 
manufacturers. Others are privately owned Italian firms – Orlandi, Fraver and 
Radici – which have close links to the textile industry. 
The changes set out in Tables 7 and 8 are similar in some respects to what 
happened in the US: withdrawals by the multi-product chemical companies; 
demergers; sales to private equity firms; and the entry of companies based in 
emerging markets. But, as the following sections will show, the timing and form 
of restructuring varied from one European country to another, reflecting the 
different institutional environments in which the companies were operating.  
                                                
36 Jean-Louis Juvet, Restructuring of the man-made fibres industry in Western Europe, CIRFS, 
Brussels, 17 February 1988.  
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  Table 7. Leading man-made fibre producers in Europe, including Turkey, in 
1992 and 2008 (annual capacity in tonnes). The country of ownership is given 
in brackets.   
 
  1992 2008 
Enichem/Montefibre (Italy)512,000 Lenzing (Austria) 310,000   
Hoechst (Germany) 418,000 Aksa (Turkey)290,000 
Akzo (Netherlands)  360,000 Sabanci (Turkey) 255,000 
Rhône-Poulenc (France)  342,000 Montefibre/Orlandi (Italy) 245,000 
ICI (UK)  230,000 Beaulieu (Belgium) 220,000 
Courtaulds (UK) 228,000 Dralon/Fraver (Italy)  190,000  
Bayer (Germany)  190,000 Korteks (Turkey)  180,000 
Lenzing (Austria)176,000 Radici (Italy)  145,000 
DuPont (US) 120,000 Trevira/Reliance (India)120,000 
Snia (Italy) 118,000 Performance Fibers (US) 93,000 
 
 
Source: The 1992 figures are taken from Stanley Davies, ‘The man-made fibre industry in 
Western Europe’, Textiles Intelligence/Economist Intelligence Unit, April 1993. The 2008 
figures are the author’s estimates based on information from industry sources. Both sets of 
figures include Turkey but exclude non-European capacity. Sabanci includes Kordsa (nylon 
industrial filament) and Advansa (polyester textile filament and staple.) Beaulieu is an 
integrated carpet manufacturer which makes some of its own fibres. 
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 Table 8. Exits from fibres 1992-2007 
 
1992 ICI sells nylon business to DuPont 
1993  Snia/Rhône Poulenc form Nylstar joint venture in nylon textile yarn 
1994 Hoechst puts Kelheim (viscose and acrylic fibre) into joint venture  
             controlled by Courtaulds 
1996 Enichem sells Montefibre to Orlandi, Italian textile group  
1997 Courtaulds acquires full control of Kelheim 
1998 Rhône-Poulenc demerges fibres and chemicals into Rhodia 
1998 Hoechst sells US polyester to KoSa, European polyester to Multikarsa        
             (later re-sold to Reliance)   
1999 Courtaulds/Akzo fibres businesses sold to CVC 
2000 Bayer sells acrylic fibre (Dralon) to Fraver, Italian textile firm 
2000 CVC sells Twaron (ex-Akzo Nobel) to Teijin 
2004 Bayer demerges chemicals and remaining fibres (including Dorlastan)   
             into Lanxess.  
2004 CVC sells Tencel (ex-Courtaulds) to Lenzing 
2004 DuPont sells European fibres (nylon, polyester, Lycra) to Koch  
             Industries, retains Kevlar plant in Northern Ireland 
2006 Lanxess sells Dorlastan to Asahi Kasei 
2007 Rhodia sells industrial fibres (Nexis) to Butler Capital Partners, private  
             equity firm 
2007 Snia/Rhodia withdraw from Nylstar  
 
The United Kingdom 
 
The British financial system went through much the same transition as that of the 
US during the 1980s: more focus on shareholder value, more hostile takeovers, 
more deals involving private equity firms. The decade was also marked by a 
radical shift in industrial policy under Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative 
government. State-owned industries were privatised and deregulated; the 
apparatus of government intervention was dismantled; and the power of the trade 
unions was sharply reduced. When big companies ran into trouble, they could no 
longer expect to be bailed out by the government, as some of them had been in the 
1960s and 1970s. There was also less resistance from trade unions to plant 
closures. 
In 1980 the man-made fibres industry was largely in the hands of 
Courtaulds and ICI — both diversified groups and thus potentially vulnerable to 
takeover. Like DuPont and Monsanto in the US, they were under increasing 
pressure in the course of the decade to construct a portfolio of businesses that 
would make them more attractive to investors. If they failed to do so, they were 
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 vulnerable to attack from one of the corporate predators roaming the business 
scene.   
Of the two, Courtaulds was more heavily committed to fibres. Founded as 
a silk weaving company in 1816, it acquired the patents to the viscose process in 
1904, and through commercial opportunism and technical skill it built up a hugely 
profitable rayon business on both sides of the Atlantic. Although it was forced to 
divest its US subsidiary during the Second World War, as part of the Lend-Lease 
agreement negotiated by the British and US governments, it entered the post-war 
period as the world’s largest manufacturer of cellulosic fibres. During the 1950s it 
diversified into other sectors, principally paints and packaging, but fibres 
remained its principal business.   
ICI came into the industry later, as a result of the patents and processes 
agreement, negotiated with DuPont in 1929. Under the terms of this agreement,  
ICI gained access to DuPont’s nylon technology. Since it had no experience in 
man-made fibres and knew little of the textile industry, it formed a 50-50 joint 
venture with Courtaulds, known as British Nylon Spinners; this operation began 
in 1940. Four years later ICI acquired the rights to make polyester fibre, and, 
much to Courtaulds’ irritation, chose to exploit this fibre (branded as Terylene) on 
its own rather than through British Nylon Spinners.37   
In 1959 Courtaulds launched its own synthetic fibre - Courtelle, an acrylic 
fibre – but it was still uncomfortably dependent on the slower-growing rayon 
business. British Nylon Spinners was profitable, but relations with ICI were 
fractious – there were frequent disputes about transfer prices for the intermediate 
chemicals made by ICI - and the two companies had overlapping or competing 
interests in other areas. In 1960, the chairman of ICI, Sir Paul Chambers, 
suggested that a merger would remove these sources of friction and create a 
powerful British man-made fibres company that could compete more effectively 
with DuPont and other international producers. (The French fibres industry had 
recently been consolidated in the hands of one company, and Chambers used this 
as an argument for an ICI/Courtaulds merger.)  When Chambers’s advances were 
rebuffed, he launched a hostile takeover bid. An acrimonious battle ensued, 
ending in defeat for ICI; its offer was accepted by less than half of Courtaulds’ 
shareholders. In the redrawing of boundaries that followed the contest, ICI bought 
full control of British Nylon Spinners and Courtaulds was free to promote its own 
brand of nylon.  
Following its victory over ICI, Courtaulds embarked on an ambitious 
expansion in textiles and clothing, partly as a means of securing captive outlets 
                                                
37 Polyester fibre was invented by a British textile company, Calico Printers Association, which 
did not have the resources to develop it and sold the technology to ICI. David Brunnschweiler and 
John Hearle (eds), Polyester, fifty years of achievement, Textile Institute, Manchester 1993.  
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 for its fibres 38 , but partly also in the belief that an injection of capital and 
technology could halt the long decline of the British textile industry. 39  The 
architect of the strategy was Frank Kearton, who believed that through scale and 
vertical integration British textile mills would be able to compete on cost with 
imports from low-wage countries; once the modernisation had been completed, 
Kearton argued, textiles in Britain would become a growth industry again. By the 
mid-1960s Courtaulds was presenting itself as a “major textile company on a 
world scale which happens to make some of its own fibres”.40   
As Courtaulds tightened its grip on the textile industry through a stream of 
acquisitions, ICI took steps to protect its own fibres business by forming a semi-
captive group of textile firms which would keep out of Courtaulds’ clutches. The 
conflict threatened to destabilise the textile industry, and the government felt 
obliged to intervene. Among the proposals that it considered was a merger of the 
two companies’ fibre interests to form a single British Fibres Corporation, but 
ministers concluded that no public interest would be served by eliminating 
competition in fibres between ICI and Courtaulds.41 The merger proposal was not 
pursued, and the two companies went their separate ways. 
Both were badly affected by the over-capacity crisis that hit the European 
man-made fibres industry in the mid-1970s. ICI stopped making polyester but 
continued in nylon, where it had a larger market share and stronger brands. 
Courtaulds withdrew from nylon and polyester but stayed in rayon and acrylic 
fibre. But it was not clear how long these businesses would remain viable. The 
European textile industry was contracting fast and the scope for exporting fibres 
to non-European markets was declining as countries such as Taiwan and South 
Korea built up their fibre industries. Courtaulds and ICI had to decide what role, if 
any, fibres should play in their future. 
In 1980 Courtaulds’ three main businesses were fibres, textiles and paints. 
The last of these had been built up by acquisition and was now the company’s 
most reliable source of profits; the investment in textiles had proved to be a 
mistake – despite a big investment in new, capital-intensive plants the industry 
continued to lose ground to low-cost imports – and this part of the group was cut 
back. The strategy that took shape under the leadership of Sir Christopher Hogg 
(chief executive from 1979 to 1991) was to build up the paints division, using it as 
the basis for expansion in speciality chemicals, to exit textiles and to use fibres 
mainly as a source of cash to support the faster-growing parts of the group. In 
                                                
38  In addition to rayon, nylon and acrylic fibre, Courtaulds was planning to make polyester as 
soon as the patents expired. 
39 Arthur Knight, Private enterprise and public intervention: the Courtaulds experience, George 
Allen and Unwin 1974.  
40 Monopolies Commission, Man-made cellulosic fibres, HMSO March 1968: 31. 
41 Edmund Dell, Political responsibility and industry, George Allen & Unwin, 1973: 93. 
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 1990 the textile and clothing side was demerged as a separate company, 
Courtaulds Textiles. This decision was applauded by investors, who, like their US 
counterparts, believed that focused companies were more likely than 
conglomerates to generate shareholder value.42 (Two years before the demerger 
there were strong rumours that a predator was planning a break-up bid for 
Courtaulds.)  
Withdrawal from fibres was also considered, but fibres represented a large 
part of the group, and as a leading European producer of acrylic fibre and one of 
the biggest and most efficient survivors in rayon Courtaulds believed that these 
two businesses could still make money. Hogg was also optimistic about a new 
fibre, later branded as Tencel, which his researchers had developed. Like rayon, it 
was cellulose-based, but it was a stronger fibre than rayon and had the great 
advantage of a closed-loop manufacturing process in which most of the chemicals 
were re-used; the viscose process used several unpleasant chemicals which had to 
be discharged into nearby lakes and rivers, and this was no longer acceptable in 
many countries. Two Tencel plants, at Mobile, Alabama, and at Grimsby in the 
UK were built in the early 1990s.  
The initial market reaction to Tencel was favourable, and partly for that 
reason fibres acquired a greater importance than had been envisaged at the time of 
the textiles demerger. Courtaulds also added to its stake in rayon and acrylic by 
buying Hoechst’s plant at Kelheim, and by 1995 the fibres side of the company 
was roughly equal in size to paints. The two businesses were unrelated, and 
Courtaulds was still stuck with the conglomerate tag. The main attraction now for 
investors was Tencel. If it was as successful as now seemed possible, it would not 
only strengthen Courtaulds’ position in what was becoming an Asia-dominated 
industry, but also lift the whole company onto a higher growth path.  
Tencel did well in Japan at the start, but it proved hard to repeat that 
success in other markets. The new fibre was more difficult to process than rayon, 
and a costly marketing effort was needed to encourage spinners and weavers to 
make the necessary modifications in their machinery. By 1997, partly because of 
the Asian economic crisis, the growth in sales was slowing down, and Courtaulds 
found itself with too much Tencel capacity on its hands. With demand also falling 
for the older fibres Courtaulds was now heavily dependent on paints. It was clear 
that this division would be rated more highly in the stock market if it were an 
independently quoted company; Courtaulds was vulnerable to a break-up bid. 
A common response for companies in this situation, in the Anglo-
American system, is to break themselves up, and in April 1998 Courtaulds 
announced plans for splitting itself in two; paints and fibres would become 
                                                
42 Investors did not object to diversification as long as each of the businesses was earning an 
adequate return, but they needed to be convinced that the parent was adding value to the 
businesses it owned.   
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 independent companies. The share price shot up after the announcement, but the 
demerger plan was overtaken a few weeks later by a takeover offer, at an even 
higher price, from Akzo Nobel of the Netherlands. Like Courtaulds, Akzo Nobel 
had both a fibres division and a paints division, but fibres was the least profitable 
part of the portfolio and the company was trying to sell it. The logic of the bid for 
Courtaulds was that Akzo Nobel would acquire a well-run paints company, while 
the combination of the two fibres business would create an entity that should be 
easier to sell or to float. Shortly after the Courtaulds takeover Akzo Nobel found a 
buyer for fibres in CVC, a private equity firm.   
Courtaulds was taken over because it failed to meet the expectations of 
shareholders. ICI went though a similar experience ten years later. It too was 
taken over, and by the same acquirer, Akzo Nobel. Like Courtaulds, it had tried to 
improve the quality of its portfolio through acquisitions and divestments, but not 
skilfully enough to retain the support of its investors. 
Since the end of the Second World War ICI had been one of the world’s 
most diversified chemical groups, competing in almost all branches of the 
industry from petrochemicals and plastics through to fibres, paints and 
pharmaceuticals. In fibres it had chosen to concentrate on nylon and polyester and 
these two products, together with the intermediate chemicals (also made by ICI), 
were big profit earners in the 1950s and 1960s. When the fibres boom collapsed 
in the second half of the 1970s ICI was forced to make drastic cutbacks in this 
division. Then came an exceptionally severe recession in the UK, precipitated by 
the anti-inflationary policies of the new Conservative government under Margaret 
Thatcher. In the third quarter of 1980 ICI recorded a loss for the first time in its 
history. Worst hit were the commodity chemicals at the upstream end of the chain, 
and over the next few years Sir John Harvey-Jones, chairman from 1982 to 1987, 
sought to shift the balance of the group towards higher-margin, less cyclical 
downstream businesses such as paints and agrochemicals. He also tried without 
success to sell petrochemicals and plastics to BP or Shell.  By the end of the 
1980s the portfolio had been partially reshaped, but ICI still had a mixed bag of 
strong and weak businesses and was out of favour with investors.  
In 1991 Sir Denys Henderson, Harvey-Jones’s successor, announced that 
ICI would concentrate only on sectors in which it could compete profitably on a 
global scale. These did not include nylon, which was sold to DuPont. The 
slimming-down of the portfolio did little to enthuse investors. ICI’s best business 
was pharmaceuticals, but the value of this division was not reflected in the share 
price, since it was buried within a collection of lower-margin chemical businesses. 
This was the opportunity spotted by James Hanson, a well-known corporate raider, 
who began buying shares in ICI, apparently with a view to making a break-up bid; 
his plan was to separate out pharmaceuticals and either sell it or float it on the 
stock market. Although in the end Hanson did not go ahead with a bid, the 
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 episode was an alarming experience for ICI, forcing the directors to look harder 
for ways of satisfying their investors. In 1993 they did what Hanson would 
probably have done if he had taken control; they broke ICI into two. 43 
Pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals and some speciality chemicals were put into a 
new company, Zeneca, which was demerged. When it was listed on the stock 
market it was valued in line with other pharmaceutical companies, thus generating 
a large gain for ICI’s shareholders.   
After the demerger ICI was still a diversified group, though less so than 
before; its four main businesses were paints, explosives, materials and industrial 
chemicals. The strategy was to push further into high-value chemicals through 
acquisitions, of which the largest by far was the purchase of Unilever’s speciality 
chemical businesses in 1997. This transaction was initially applauded by 
shareholders, but the price – nearly $8 billion - was almost certainly too high. ICI  
financed the purchase by borrowing from the banks, and the debt was to be repaid 
through the sale of ICI’s unwanted commodity businesses. Soon after the 
Unilever purchase, ICI announced the sale of three large units - titanium dioxide, 
polyester intermediates, and polyester film - to DuPont for $3 billion. However, 
US antitrust authorities blocked the titanium dioxide sale, and several other 
projected sales fell through. By the end of 1998 ICI still had a large amount of 
debt to pay off. To make matters worse, some of the companies acquired from 
Unilever performed less well than expected.  
The combination of delayed disposals and poor operating performance 
strained ICI’s finances, and the share price fell sharply. After a change of 
management in 2003, profits improved and ICI seemed to have a viable future as 
a medium-sized chemical company, focused mainly on paints and speciality 
chemicals.  However, the paints industry at this time was going through a process 
of consolidation, and ICI was a possible acquisition target for one of the larger 
European or American manufacturers looking to expand their share of the world 
market. It was the Dutch company, Akzo Nobel, which moved first. Having 
absorbed Courtaulds a few years earlier, it saw the takeover of ICI as a way of 
reinforcing its position as the world’s largest paints manufacturer and 
strengthening its business in Asia. Although the ICI directors resisted the opening 
bid, Akzo Nobel raised the offer price to a level at which they had no choice but 
to recommend the offer to shareholders. As in the Courtaulds case, Akzo Nobel 
was only interested in ICI’s paints division. The other businesses were sold.   
That Courtaulds and ICI were both taken over and broken up was due to 
earlier mistakes which had undermined the confidence of shareholders – in one 
case, the plunge into textiles and clothing, in the other, the handling of the 
Unilever transaction in 1997. That the acquirer in both cases was a non-British 
                                                
43 Geoffrey Owen and Trevor Harrison, Why ICI decided to demerge, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April 1995:133-142. 
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 company reflects another feature of the British business environment: its openness 
to inward investment. The Labour governments of the 1960s and 1970s had 
sought to create British-owned national champions in so-called strategic 
industries, but that policy was firmly rejected by Margaret Thatcher, and since the 
1980s no obstacles have been put in the way of foreign acquirers. Following the 
conversion of the Labour Party in the early 1990s to market-based economic 
policies, the general view across the political spectrum has been that inward 
investment, whether in the form of acquisition or the construction of new factories, 
brings capital, technology and management into the UK, and strengthens the 
British economy. In the case of the chemical industry, in addition to Courtaulds 
and ICI, several of the other leading British companies have been taken over.44  
The few ex-ICI and ex-Courtaulds fibres plants that continue to operate in the UK 
are owned by non-British companies.45  
Acquisitions by foreign companies are made easier by the fact that, in 
contrast to Germany and some other European countries, most British companies 
are owned by a wide spread of investors, mostly financial institutions, which have 
no long-term commitment to the business; if a bidder offers a high enough price 
for their shares, they are generally willing to sell out. This is one of the 
institutional factors which underlies the restructuring that has taken place in the 
British chemical industry over the last thirty years. 
 
Germany 
  
In Germany “firms are social institutions, not just networks of private contracts or 
the property of their shareholders“. 46  In the so-called Rhineland model of 
capitalism47 companies pursue growth rather than profitability, invest steadily in 
the development of new products and processes, provide stable employment for 
their workforce, and have strong obligations to the communities where their 
plants are located. The system has been modified in recent years as a result of the 
growing presence of foreign shareholders but Germany has moved only part of 
the way towards the Anglo-American model. The challenge for managers has 
been to meet the expectations of international investors while at the same time 
preserving the essential features of the Rhineland model. As this section will 
                                                
44 These included Albright & Wilson, bought by Rhodia of France in 1999, Allied Colloids, 
bought by Ciba of Switzerland in 1998, and Laporte, bought by Degussa of Germany in 2001.  
45 These include Lenzing’s Tencel plant in Grimsby and Invista’s small nylon plant at Gloucester, 
built by ICI and later sold to DuPont. Invista also owns the ex-DuPont Lycra plant in Northern 
Ireland; DuPont makes aramid fibre on the same site.   
46 Wolfgang Streeck, German capitalism: does it exist? Can it survive? In Colin Crouch and 
Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Political economy of modern capitalism: mapping convergence and 
diversity, Sage 1997.  
47 Michel Albert, Capitalism against capitalism, English language edition, Whurr Publishers 1993. 
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 show, the two leading fibre manufacturers responded to this challenge in different 
ways.   
The structure of the German chemical industry was established in 1950, 
when I G Farben, the pre-war colossus of the industry, was broken up by the 
occupying powers. Its three principal constituents, Hoechst, Bayer and BASF, 
became independent companies. I G Farben’s fibre-making plants were taken 
over by Hoechst and Bayer. (BASF did not enter the fibre business directly, but 
supplied intermediate chemicals to the fibre manufacturers.48) By 1970 Hoechst 
and Bayer had a broad range of man-made fibres and were active in international 
markets; Hoechst built a polyester plant in the US in 1968. 
Both companies participated in the European rationalisation scheme that 
took effect in the early 1980s, but there was no thought at that time of 
withdrawing from fibres. Indeed, Hoechst, which had become Europe’s largest 
polyester fibre manufacturer, increased in its stake in the industry in 1987 when it 
acquired Celanese in the US. Although, as described earlier, Hoechst was required 
by the US antitrust authorities to divest part of Celanese’s polyester business, the 
German company remained a big producer of polyester in the US and in Europe; 
it also had a plant at Kelheim in Bavaria making acrylic fibre and rayon. Bayer’s 
main strength was in acrylic fibre – it had acquired additional capacity as part of 
the European rationalisation scheme – but it also produced Dorlastan elastane 
fibre, a competitor to DuPont’s Lycra, as well as nylon on a smaller scale.  
Both companies were horizontally diversified and vertically integrated, 
and the virtues of this structure were not seriously questioned until the 1990s. By 
that time Anglo-American investors were becoming significant shareholders in 
large German companies, and although the threat of hostile takeover was largely 
absent shareholder interests had to be taken more seriously.49 Companies such as 
Hoechst and Bayer were also becoming active as buyers of non-German firms; a 
high share price was necessary to finance share-based acquisitions.   
The first to break the mould was Hoechst. Jürgen Dormann, who became 
chief executive in 1994, was the first non-chemist in the company’s history to 
hold the post. His appointment came at a time of concern, inside and outside the 
                                                
48 BASF did later enter the industry in Germany and the US, initially in partnership with Dow, but 
it was never a leading producer. Its last remaining US fibre business was sold in 2005.   
49 The takeover of Mannesmann by the British company, Vodafone, in 2000, far from marking the 
end of Rhineland capitalism, as some commentators suggested, was an exceptional event, and did 
not lead to a more active takeover market in Germany. For an account of the evolution of German 
share ownership, see Caroline Fohlin, The history of corporate ownership and control in Germany, 
in Randall Morck (ed), Corporate governance around the world: family business groups to 
professional managers, Chicago 2005.   
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 company, that Hoechst had become too bureaucratic and slow-moving. 50 
Dormann had handled the take-over of Celanese in 1987 and was more attuned 
than most German managers to American ideas about how companies should be 
run; several ex-Celanese executives were closely involved in the transformation 
of Hoechst that took place under his leadership.51   
Like his counterparts at DuPont and Monsanto, Dormann saw the life 
sciences as offering the best opportunity. Hoechst already had a pharmaceutical 
arm, but it needed to get bigger, and this would require large investments both in 
research and in acquisitions. Hoechst’s low share price ruled out recourse to the 
capital markets, and Dormann’s plan was to finance expansion in pharmaceuticals 
by divesting the company’s chemical businesses. 
In 1995 he bought a US pharmaceutical company, Marion Merrell Dow, 
for $7 billion. At first he intended to float the enlarged pharmaceutical business 
on the stock market as a separate company (as ICI had done with Zeneca), but that 
idea was dropped in favour of focusing Hoechst itself on the life sciences. Even 
after the Marion acquisition Hoechst was smaller than the industry leaders, and 
Dormann believed that another acquisition or partnership was necessary. The 
result was “a merger of equals” with Rhône-Poulenc in France. The merged 
company, Aventis, ranked briefly as one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical 
firms but in 2004 it was taken over by another French company, Sanofi-
Synthélabo; the new group was renamed Sanofi-Aventis.  
The consequence of these events was that Hoechst, one of the most 
illustrious names in German industry, ceased to exist as an independent entity. 
Many employees were bitter about what Dormann had done and he was fiercely 
attacked in the German press. Yet most of the businesses that he divested 
prospered outside the Hoechst umbrella. The break-up was based on an 
unsentimental appraisal of how each of Hoechst’s businesses was positioned and 
under what sort of ownership it was likely to prosper. The European polyester 
fibre business, known as Trevira, was sold to an Indonesian group and later re-
sold to Reliance of India.52 
                                                
50 Ansgar Richter, Corporate restructuring in the United Kingdom and West Germany: recent 
developments in large non-financial companies, Unpublished PhD thesis, London School of 
Economics, 1998. 
51  Ariane Berthoin Antal, The transformation of Hoechst into Aventis, WZB and Henley 
Management College 2001. For a comparison of Hoechst’s strategy with that of Bayer and BASF 
see Sigurt Vitols, Shareholder value, management culture and production regimes in the 
transformation of the German chemical-pharmaceutical industry, WZB Discussion paper, August 
2002. 
52 Reliance, which is the world’s largest polyester fibre manufacturer, put Trevira into receivership 
in 2009, but the business continued to operate and in 2011 it was bought by a consortium made up 
of Indorama, a Thailand-based group, and Sinterama, an Italian fibre producer.    
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 What Dormann had done was extraordinary in the German context, and 
there was no rush to follow his example. Bayer made several changes in its 
portfolio during the 1990s, including, at the end of the decade, the sale of acrylic 
fibres to Fraver, an Italian textile company; Bayer described Dralon as a cyclical 
commodity business, which was no longer part of the company’s core activities. 
But it retained other fibre businesses including Dorlastan, which was 
manufactured in the US as well as in Germany, and there was no thought of 
restructuring the company as drastically as Dormann had done at Hoechst. An 
academic commentator wrote that Bayer’s chief executive, Manfred Schneider, in 
contrast to Dormann, “has maintained a public commitment to the ‘Rhineland 
capitalism’ model of corporate management, including major decisions made in 
consensus with stakeholders and an incremental approach to change”.53 Schneider 
refused to bow to pressure from investment analysts for a break-up, and continued 
to pursue a “four-pillar” strategy, based on polymers, chemicals, health care, and 
agrochemicals.  
The pressure from shareholders proved impossible to resist when Bayer 
ran into a financial crisis in 2001. One of its best-selling medicines, an anti-
cholesterol drug called Baycol, had to be withdrawn because of dangerous side-
effects. The share price fell by some 40 per cent after the announcement. This 
precipitated a reconstruction of the group, leading in 2004 to a demerger, which 
was similar in some respects to the ICI/Zeneca demerger of 1993. Bayer retained 
pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals and advanced materials, while a new company, 
Lanxess, was set up to take on the other chemical businesses; these included 
Dorlastan, which was sold two years later to Asahi Kasei. Some analysts 
suggested that Bayer should have gone further by divesting advanced materials 
and becoming a pure life sciences company, but at the time this article was 
written the three-division structure remained in place.   
The third member of the German “Big Three” chemical companies, BASF, 
was even more determined not to follow the Anglo-American path. It stuck to the 
policy of “Verbundproduktion”, whereby intermediate products generated at one 
stage in the production process are fed into later stages; its Ludwigshafen plant is 
the world’s largest integrated chemical complex under a single management. 
Jürgen Hambrecht, chief executive, claimed that BASF, unlike other chemical 
companies, had “succeeded in extending its position and creating value along 
almost the entire chemical value chain.” In an apparent reference to Hoechst and 
ICI, he said that BASF had “never pursued a course of complex split-ups or 
questionable mega-mergers.’54   
                                                
53 Vitols, Shareholder value, management culture and production regimes. 
54  Dr Jürgen Hambrecht, BASF press conference, 10 December 2003. This stance has not 
prevented BASF from making major portfolio changes, including several large acquisitions and 
divestments.  
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 Thus the Rhineland model was by no means dead. Moreover, although the 
Hoechst break-up and the Bayer demerger were unwelcome to employees and 
trade unions, both companies tried hard to ensure that their divested businesses 
were in good shape when they were sold and that the new owners would continue 
to invest in them. A notable difference between Germany and the UK is that while 
most of the ex-ICI and ex-Courtaulds fibre plants have been closed down, a 
substantial fibres industry continues in Germany, including the ex-Hoechst 
factories at Bobingen and Kelheim, the ex-Bayer plant at Dormagen and the ex-
Akzo industrial fibre plants at Obernburg. Germany remains the largest European 
man-made fibre producer, accounting for about 30 per cent of production. While 
this partly reflects the strength of German fibre-using industries, especially the car 
and truck manufacturers, the restructuring of the German industry has been less 
drastic, and less painful in terms of job losses, than in the UK. Stability of 
employment ranks more highly in the minds of German managers when they are 
divesting a business than is the case in the UK.  
 
Austria 
  
More than any other European country, Austria has clung to the corporatist model 
based on partnership between capital, labour and government. Austria is unusual, 
too, in the extent of government influence on the structure and ownership of 
industry. For much of the post-war period the leading banks have been partially 
state-controlled, and even after the privatisations of the 1990s the government has 
remained a key shareholder in several of the privatised companies. The few 
private-sector companies listed on the Vienna stock exchange generally have 
dominant owners who have a long-term commitment to the business. Many of 
them are controlled by families or foundations, with only a small proportion of the 
shares traded on the stock exchange. The market for corporate control is 
practically non-existent.55 Despite some inroads by Anglo-American investors in 
recent years, the obstacles to the spread of a shareholder value orientation are 
probably greater in Austria than in any of the other countries discussed in this 
article. 
Out of this environment has emerged Europe’s most successful 
manufacturer of man-made fibres. Lenzing is not only the leading producer of 
fibres in Europe, but it also has a large and profitable business in Asia. While it 
would be wrong to say that Lenzing has succeeded because of the Austrian 
                                                
55 Renate E. Meyer and Markus A. Höllerer, Meaning structures in a contested issue field: a 
topographic map of shareholder value in Austria, Academy of Management Journal,  53 (6) 
2010:1241-1262. On ownership concentration in Austria, see K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper and 
J. Zechner, The separation of ownership and control in Austria, in Fabrizio Barca and Marco 
Becht (eds), The control of corporate Europe, Oxford 2001. 
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 business system – good management must take a large share of the credit – the 
Lenzing story provides the clearest illustration of the link between corporate 
strategy and national environment.   
 Lenzing is a town in Upper Austria between Linz and Salzburg. In 1939, 
after the Anschluss, it was chosen by the German authorities as the site for a new 
rayon mill; it was one of several rayon plants established at that time to reduce 
Germany’s dependence on imported cotton.56 After the war the company was 
controlled by two partially state-owned banks, Landerbank and Creditanstalt. 
Subsequent mergers in the banking industry led to the creation of Bank Austria, 
which became the principal shareholder. Lenzing was listed on the Vienna Stock 
Exchange in 1985 but only about 10 per cent of the shares were offered to outside 
investors. As a public company Lenzing was expected to make profits and to pay 
dividends but it was not a shareholder-driven company. As the principal employer 
in its region, it had a social responsibility which influenced its strategic decisions, 
not least its determination to make the best possible use of the site.  
 Unlike Courtaulds, which imported its woodpulp mainly from South 
Africa, the Lenzing factory was situated close to an existing pulp mill which was 
taken over in 1969; woodpulp and rayon production were linked in an integrated 
operation. Lenzing generated power from the by-products of the pulping process 
and produced a variety of chemicals that were converted, mostly through joint 
ventures with other companies, into high-value products.  A drawback of the site 
was the lack of water and Lenzing had to invest in costly techniques to reduce its 
water consumption while also meeting the environmental rules laid down by the 
provincial government. The result was a cleaner manufacturing process, giving 
the company the confidence to continue investing in viscose at a time when other 
producers were cutting back. Lenzing also developed new cellulosic fibres, 
notably Modal, which was more resistant to fading and shrinking than viscose.  
  Lenzing took a cautious approach to synthetic fibres. It made a brief 
foray into acrylic fibre, and it had a joint venture with Hoechst in polyester, but it 
was never a major producer of either fibre. Because of its limited involvement in 
synthetics, Lenzing was not greatly affected by the European fibres crisis of the 
1970s. At the end of that decade it made what turned out to be an important 
decision to participate in an Indonesian viscose plant with the Indian Ashok Birla 
group. The Indians had asked for technical assistance and in exchange Lenzing 
secured a minority interest in the new company. This plant, which started 
production in 1982, gave Lenzing a foothold in a region where demand for man-
made fibres was growing fast, and paved the way for subsequent investments in 
Asia.  
                                                
56  Jonas Scherner, The beginnings of Nazi autarky policy: the “National Pulp Programme” and the 
origin of regional staple fibre plants, Economic History Review, 61(4) 2008: 867-895. 
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 Another overseas venture was less successful. In 1992 Lenzing acquired a 
rayon plant in the US, but over the next few years demand for rayon in the US fell 
sharply, and this contributed to a drop in Lenzing’s profits. Bank Austria, which 
had been acquired by a German bank, Hypo-Vereinsbank, considered selling the 
company and several Asian groups were rumoured to be interested but no deal 
was done. Bank Austria’s shares in Lenzing were later transferred to an Austrian 
foundation, B & C Holding, whose mission was to act as a long-term core 
investor in Lenzing, with a commitment to maintain the company’s role in the 
Austrian economy. 
 In 2004 Lenzing acquired the ex-Courtaulds Tencel business from CVC, 
the private equity firm which, as noted above, had bought Acordis, the fibres 
company set up by Akzo Nobel after the Courtaulds takeover. This was a risky 
decision for the Austrian company. It was already producing a rival fibre to 
Tencel at Heiligenkreuz in Austria, and it was not clear whether demand would be 
sufficient to keep all three plants – Grimsby, Mobile and Heiligenkreuz  – fully 
employed. But Thomas Fahnemann, who had joined Lenzing as chief executive in 
2003, believed that Tencel would become, if not a mainstream fibre, a valuable 
addition to Lenzing’s range of cellulosic fibres. By buying the ex-Courtaulds 
plants Lenzing would establish a dominant position in a promising sector of the 
market.   
 Fahnemann, a German who had spent most of his earlier career with 
Hoechst, brought an international perspective to the Austrian company. 57  He 
believed that Lenzing could be more than a medium-sized European player in the 
man-made fibres industry. In addition to the Tencel purchase, he oversaw an 
expansion of Lenzing’s interests in Asia. The shareholding in the Indonesian joint 
venture was increased to 86 per cent and Lenzing built a viscose staple plant at 
Nanjing in China, which came on stream in 2005. Two years later Fahnemann 
announced plans to build a third Asian plant in India. 
 By 2010 Lenzing was the world’s largest producer of cellulosic fibres, a 
position held by Courtaulds some forty years earlier. The Tencel acquisition had 
been a success; plans for a new plant on the Lenzing site were announced early in 
2011, and Lenzing was continuing to invest in the ex-Courtaulds plants at 
Grimsby and in Alabama. At a time of growing environmental awareness among 
consumers, Tencel had the great advantage of “greenness” - it was made from 
renewable materials by a non-polluting process  – and hence was attractive to 
clothing retailers such as Marks and Spencer and H & M which were keen to 
                                                
57 Fahnemann had also spent two years in the US with Celanese after the Hoechst takeover in 
1987. He later became chief operating officer of KoSa, the Mexican-American consortium that 
bought Hoechst’s US polyester business. 
34
Capitalism and Society, Vol. 6 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://www.bepress.com/cas/vol6/iss1/art3
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0213.1080
 establish their credentials as environmentally conscious companies. 58  More 
generally, cellulosic fibres, including viscose, were staging something of a 
comeback, partly for environmental reasons, partly because of a shift in consumer 
tastes away from fabrics based on synthetic fibres. The surge in cotton prices that 
began in 2010 also stimulated demand for a man-made substitute.  
While other fibre companies diversified, Lenzing stuck to what it knew 
best, and did everything in its power to maintain the viability of its main Austrian 
site. Its success was based on patient investment in new products and in new 
manufacturing methods. Although cellulosics represent less than 10 per cent of 
world man-made fibre production, compared to some 70 per cent for polyester 
(Table 2), the market is big enough to provide Lenzing with a profitable living. 
Despite growing competition from Asian producers the Austrian company looks 
likely to maintain its leading position.  
 
The Netherlands 
   
“The corporatist model of centralised, consensual decision-making, known as the 
poldermodel, was very successful in the reconstruction of the Dutch economy 
after World War II”.59 At the national level trade unions were expected to show 
restraint in their wage demands, and in return were given a voice in decisions 
affecting job security and employment. Firms came to be seen as “independent 
entities oriented towards continuity, stability and the interests of multiple 
stakeholders”. Shareholders were just one of the constituencies to which 
companies were responsible, and they had little influence over the management of 
the firms in which they invested. Until the end of the 1990s most Dutch 
companies had impregnable defences against takeover. Although some of these 
defences have now been dismantled, and Anglo-American investors play a much 
larger role in the Dutch economy, the continuity of the enterprise and of 
employment remains a more important consideration for Dutch managers than for 
their counterparts in the UK. This institutional background provides part of the 
explanation, but only part, of why Akzo Nobel continues to exist and ICI and 
Courtaulds do not. 
                                                
58 Like other man-made fibres, Tencel is used in non-woven applications as well as in textiles. 
When Costco, a large US wholesaling company, introduced a new range of Tencel-based baby 
wipes in 2009, it put considerable stress on the fibre’s biodegradability as well as its ultra-softness 
and absorbency. “More than ever”, according to Costco, “parents want products that are naturally 
made from raw materials but are also safe for the environment. That is why Tencel is the ideal 
New Age material.” 
59 Abe de Jong and Ailsa Röell, Financing and Control in The Netherlands, in Randall K. Morck 
(ed), A history of corporate governance around the world: family business groups to professional 
managers, University of Chicago Press 2005. 
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 The origins of Akzo Nobel go back to 1911, when the first Dutch rayon 
factory was built at Arnhem. The company, Enka, was one of the leading 
European rayon producers in the inter-war years, along with Courtaulds in Britain, 
Glanzstoff in Germany, and Snia Viscosa in Italy. It became even stronger in 
1929 when it merged with Glanzstoff to form AKU. After the war this Dutch-
German group extended its range from rayon to include the three main synthetic 
fibres, and built up a network of overseas subsidiaries. Until 1969 AKU was 
almost wholly devoted to fibres, but in that year it merged with KZO, a Dutch 
conglomerate which had a range of businesses including paints, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals; the enlarged group was called Akzo. There was little industrial 
logic in the merger, but KZO’s profitable pharmaceutical business was a vital 
source of stability in the 1970s, offsetting losses in fibres.  
 Aarnout Loudon took over as chief executive in 1981, and like 
Christopher Hogg at Courtaulds, his task was to give Akzo a new sense of 
direction after a period of poor performance. Of the four main businesses – 
pharmaceuticals, paints, chemicals and fibres – pharmaceuticals was a logical 
candidate for expansion, but Akzo’s low share price ruled out share-based 
takeovers of other pharmaceutical companies. Loudon’s strategy was to build up 
paints and chemicals by acquisition and to shift fibres away from textile to 
industrial end-uses where the European customer base was stronger. Like 
Courtaulds, Akzo looked to technology as a means of strengthening the fibres 
business. Whereas Courtaulds was pinning its hopes on Tencel, Akzo took the 
bold decision to launch an aramid fibre, branded as Twaron, a direct competitor to 
DuPont’s Kevlar. 
Akzo was less vulnerable to the takeover threat than Courtaulds; like 
many Dutch companies, it had special provisions in its articles of association that 
virtually ruled out a hostile bid. Thus it was under no pressure to “de-diversify”, 
although fibres, the least profitable of the four divisions, played a diminishing role 
as acquisitions were made elsewhere. The most important of these deals, the 
merger with Nobel of Sweden in 1994, made Akzo, renamed Akzo Nobel, one of 
the largest European paints manufacturers, and it was after this transaction that 
the top managers decided to withdraw completely from fibres. After abortive talks 
with several potential buyers Akzo Nobel saw the weakness of Courtaulds as an 
opportunity both to exit fibres and to strengthen its position in coatings. 
Courtaulds’ fibres side was put together with the Dutch company’s own fibres 
subsidiary, renamed Acordis and sold to a private equity firm, CVC.  
The expectation when this sale took place was that Acordis, in which 
Akzo Nobel retained a 21 per cent stake, would be kept in one piece as a 
dedicated fibres manufacturer, and later sold or floated on the stock market. The 
trade unions, which were suspicious of private equity, were assured that CVC 
would run Acordis with due regard to employee interests, in line with established 
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 Dutch practice. However, not long after the sale to CVC, the new owners received 
an offer from Teijin of Japan to buy the Twaron aramid fibre business at a price 
that CVC regarded as too high to refuse. Following this transaction, CVC saw that 
more money could be made by selling Acordis piecemeal than by keeping it as an 
integrated enterprise. The works council was uneasy, fearing that the new 
approach would be detrimental to the interests of employees, but Akzo Nobel 
promised to use its influence as a substantial minority shareholder in Acordis to 
ensure that, wherever possible, the various fibres businesses went into the hands 
of acquirers who would continue to invest in them. Some closures were 
unavoidable, but the two best parts of Acordis, Twaron and Tencel, both went to 
owners -Teijin and Lenzing - who were fully committed to the business.  
 Having disposed of fibres, Akzo Nobel had to decide whether it should go 
forward with the three remaining divisions  – paints, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals – or narrow its portfolio further, in line with the prevailing trend 
towards focus. As in Germany, Anglo-American investors were becoming more 
important as shareholders in Dutch companies, most of which did not have a 
dominant or controlling investor. There had also been changes in Dutch corporate 
governance rules, which removed or weakened anti-takeover devices. Those 
defences remaining in place were designed to allow management to negotiate a 
higher price for shareholders and to protect the interests of other stakeholders, 
including employees, rather than as a means of obstructing the bid. US-based 
hedge funds and private equity firms were increasingly active in targeting poorly 
managed Dutch companies. 
In 2006 Akzo Nobel announced that the pharmaceutical business would be 
separated from the rest of the group, and either sold or floated on the stock market. 
Hans Wijers, the chief executive said the break-up would “enhance shareholder 
value through increased management and strategic focus and greater 
transparency”, the same argument used by ICI when it demerged Zeneca in 
1993.60 Investors welcomed the decision As the Financial Times commented, 
“Akzo’s attempt to straddle the businesses of drugs and chemicals has won it few 
friends in the markets in recent years.” 61  In 2007 Akzo Nobel sold the 
pharmaceutical business to Schering-Plough of the US, and used the proceeds to 
buy ICI in Britain. As in the Courtaulds case, Akzo Nobel was only interested in 
ICI’s paints division; the other businesses were sold. 
Thus by 2008 Akzo Nobel had done what Anglo-American investors 
wanted. It had narrowed down the portfolio to its best businesses and withdrawn 
from those in which it no longer had a competitive advantage or which would be 
valued more highly by different owners. The process had taken longer than would 
have been acceptable in the UK or the US, and this was partly due to the relative 
                                                
60 Akzo Nobel press statement, 7 February 2006. 
61 Financial Times, 15 August  2006. 
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 freedom from shareholder pressure that Akzo enjoyed. The fact that, unlike ICI, 
Akzo was not forced by shareholders to demerge or sell pharmaceuticals in the 
1990s gave the Dutch company a bargaining chip which it was able to use at a 
time of its own choosing. To that extent Akzo Nobel had greater freedom of 
manoeuvre than Courtaulds or ICI. But it was also constrained, to a greater extent 
than the British companies, by the need to secure the assent of employees to 
major disposals or closures. This did not prevent the divestment of fibres, or the 
sale of Organon, but in both cases the works council had the power to block or at 
least delay the deal.62  
Akzo Nobel is an international company; most of its employees (and its 
shareholders) are located outside the Netherlands. But the fact that it ranks as one 
of the biggest Dutch industrial companies (alongside Philips and the two Anglo-
Dutch groups, Royal Dutch Shell and Unilever), just as it did in the 1970s, 
demonstrates a degree of continuity in the country’s industrial structure which is 
in marked contrast to British experience. The survival of Akzo Nobel is partly a 
matter of good management - it avoided serious strategic errors comparable to 
Courtaulds’ foray into textiles and clothing - but cannot be entirely divorced from 
the national environment in which it was based.  
 
France 
 
For much of the post-war period French capitalism has been statist rather than 
corporatist. The government played a large role in influencing the structure and 
ownership of industry; the trade unions were weak; and there was little interest in 
consensual decision-making between capital and labour. The stock exchange 
played only a modest role as a source of capital, and there was no active market 
for corporate control; many listed companies had a dominant investor, often a 
member of the founding family. Since the 1990s, however, the French system has 
gone through important changes, bringing it nearer to the Anglo-American model. 
Although relations between the state and large industrial companies are closer 
than in other European countries, and the government continues to regard some 
industries as “strategic” and hence off limits for foreign acquirers, the trend has 
been towards greater openness and fuller integration into the world market.63 
Share ownership in large companies is more widely dispersed, making them 
                                                
62 Schering-Plough, which bought Organon, Akzo Nobel’s pharmaceutical division, in 2007, was 
later acquired by another US company, Merck, and the new owners decided to close down 
Organon’s R & D facility in the Netherlands. This was strongly resisted by the Organon works 
council, leading to court proceedings which were still in progress when this article was written.  
63  Vivien A. Schmidt, From state to market? The transformation of French business and 
government, Cambridge 1996. See also Bob Hancké, Large firms and institutional change, 
industrial renewal and economic restructuring in France, Oxford 2002.  
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 potentially vulnerable to takeover. When Mittal announced its bid for Arcelor, the 
steel company, in 2006, the government made clear its displeasure, but did not 
seek to frustrate the deal; the outcome was decided by shareholders. There has 
been a partial revival of interventionism under President Sarkozy, but, as Jonah 
Levy has remarked, “globalisation has greatly complicated the task of pursuing 
dirigiste strategies…Dirigisme was far better suited to the hothouse environment 
of post-war protected markets than to an increasingly globalising economy”.64 
Outside a few sectors, principally those linked to defence or infrastructure, 
industrial companies are now generally free to pursue their strategies without 
interference from the state.  
The shift towards greater reliance on markets is reflected in the evolution 
of the French chemical industry, and of Rhône-Poulenc in particular, over the last 
fifty years. The fact that Rhône-Poulenc was broken up in 1998, as ICI had been 
five years earlier, can be seen as an example of this shift, although in the French 
case, in contrast to the UK, the government took a close interest in how the deal 
was handled, ensuring that French national interests were protected.   
The first significant government intervention in the chemical industry took 
place in the early 1960s. At that time the industry was made up of a group of 
private-sector firms, all of which were smaller than international competitors such 
as ICI in Britain, together with two state-owned oil companies which had some 
petrochemical plants. The largest of the non-state firms was Rhône-Poulenc; at 
that time it derived about half its sales from man-made fibres, with the rest 
coming from pharmaceuticals, fine chemicals and other products. Its fibres 
business included a large stake in cellulosic fibres (rayon and acetate), but nylon 
was its biggest profit earner; it had acquired a nylon licence from DuPont in 1938 
and had a virtual monopoly of the French nylon market until the patents expired 
in 1963. Rhône-Poulenc also obtained a polyester licence from ICI, and this, too, 
was a profitable business.  
By the mid-1960s, following the expiry of the key patents, the reduction of 
tariff barriers within the Common Market and the entry of US producers such as 
DuPont and Monsanto, the European fibres market had become far more 
competitive, and Rhône-Poulenc was slow to react.  Other French chemical 
companies were also performing poorly during this period, prompting the 
government to look for ways of reorganising the industry.65 The hope was that by 
creating larger groups and reshuffling assets among them France could create one 
or more national champions capable of holding their own against their powerful 
                                                
64 Jonah D. Levy, The return of the state? French economic policy under Nicolas Sarkozy, Paper 
presented to the 106th Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington 
DC, 2-5 September 2010.  
65 Elie Cohen and Michel Bauer, Les grandes manoeuvres industrielles, Belford 1985. 
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 competitors on the other side of the Rhine. Rhône-Poulenc was to be one of the 
poles on which the restructured industry would be based.  
Some mergers and asset swaps took place – Rhône-Poulenc acquired 
additional assets at the upstream end of the chemical chain – but they did little to 
prepare the industry for the much more difficult trading conditions that followed 
the oil price increase in 1973/74. Rhône-Poulenc’s fibres division made heavy 
losses in the second half of the 1970s. With other chemical companies also in bad 
shape, it was clear that further government intervention was necessary if a viable 
industry was to be preserved; the alternative for several of the companies was 
bankruptcy, or perhaps a takeover by a non-French firm.  
The intervention took the form of nationalisation. Francois Mitterrand’s 
Socialist government, elected in 1981 on a platform that promised decisive action 
to strengthen French industry, set in train a sweeping nationalisation programme 
that brought most of the country’s largest industrial companies into public 
ownership. Although the motivation was largely political, nationalisation also had 
an economic rationale: the industries affected urgently needed recapitalisation. 
Between 1982 and 1984 the five largest firms – CGE, Péchiney, Saint-Gobain, 
Thomson and Rhône-Poulenc - received ten times more in capital than private 
shareholders had provided in the eight years between 1974 and 1981.66 In the case 
of chemicals the government was also able to restructure the industry more 
effectively than had been possible in the 1960s and 1970s. Rhône-Poulenc 
divested most of its heavy chemical interests while acquiring additional assets in 
pharmaceuticals, agrochemicals and fine chemicals; it continued to be a major 
producer of man-made fibres, although by the mid-1980s this division accounted 
for less than 20 per cent of its sales.  
An economic crisis in 1983 forced the Socialist government to rein back 
its industrial ambitions, and three years later it was replaced by a centre-right 
government determined to reverse the nationalisation programme. Some sixty-
five enterprises were scheduled to be sold over a five year-period and by mid-
1987 nearly half of them (not including Rhône-Poulenc) had been floated. The 
programme was then halted, first by the worldwide stock market crash in October 
1987, and then by the return of a  Socialist  government in 1988.  
During what was called the ni-ni period (neither nationalisation nor 
privatisation) which lasted until 1993; Rhône-Poulenc remained in the public 
sector. However, during the decade in which it was owned by the government, 
Rhône-Poulenc went through a remarkable transformation. Jean-René Fourtou, 
who was appointed chief executive after the change of government in 1986, set 
out to internationalise the group, to shift the portfolio towards pharmaceuticals 
and agrochemicals, and to raise Rhône-Poulenc into the front rank of the world 
                                                
66 Schmidt, From state to market? 125.  
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 chemical industry. This involved numerous acquisitions in Europe and the US, 
culminating in 1990 in the purchase of a majority stake in Rorer, a US 
pharmaceutical company, for $2 billion. By then pharmaceuticals and 
agrochemicals accounted for more than 60 per cent of Rhône-Poulenc’s operating 
profits, with the rest coming from chemicals and fibres. According to the 
Financial Times, Fourtou had converted Rhône-Poulenc “from a rag-bag of 
chemicals businesses into the envy of the industry”.67  
Following the return of a centre-right government to power in 1993, 
Rhône-Poulenc was an early candidate for privatisation. It was successfully 
floated in the summer of that year, with Fourtou continuing as chief executive. In 
common with other privatised companies, the government arranged for some 20 
per cent of the shares to be held by a hard core or noyau dur of stable 
shareholders, principally French banks and insurance companies; this was to give 
the companies a degree of stability after the flotation, and to deter any unwelcome 
takeover.  
The privatised Rhône-Poulenc had four main businesses: pharmaceuticals; 
agrochemicals, speciality chemicals; and fibres and polymers. In fibres, its main 
strength was in nylon. It was one of the largest European nylon producers, and, 
like DuPont in the US (with which it had close technical links68), it was fully 
integrated, making intermediate chemicals and polymers as well as nylon 
engineering plastics and fibres. Its market position in nylon was strengthened by a 
series of joint ventures with Snia in Italy, of which the most important was 
Nylstar, focused on textile fibre. Rhône-Poulenc also still had a substantial stake 
in polyester and acetate. 
Whether these four businesses fit logically under the same ownership was 
an issue which came to the fore in the years after privatisation, especially in the 
light of moves by ICI and other chemical groups to separate out their 
pharmaceutical divisions as independent companies. Fourtou continued to argue 
that the four-division structure was a source of strength, and he ruled out an ICI-
style demerger, a decision that was described as “antediluvian” by the Financial 
Times. The newspaper pointed out that several of its rivals “had either announced 
or carried out such a split and unlocked huge value for their shareholders”.69  
In 1996, with some members of the noyau dur selling their shares and an 
increasing presence of foreign investors on the share register, there was 
speculation that Rhône-Poulenc could be the target of a hostile take-over. The 
separately quoted Rhône-Poulenc Rorer, in which the French parent had a 68 per 
                                                
67 Financial Times, November 26, 1992. 
68  DuPont had developed unique technology for making adiponitrile, the key intermediate 
chemical for nylon, and had formed a joint venture with Rhône-Poulenc to make this chemical in 
France.  
69 Financial Times, 5 November 5, 1996.  
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 cent interest, was valued more highly in the stock market than Rhône-Poulenc 
itself.70 A break-up bid was a possibility, and it was not completely certain that 
either French shareholders or the French government could prevent it.   
In 1997 Fourtou did what analysts had been urging, announcing that fibres 
and chemicals would be put into a separate company, to be called Rhodia, and 
demerged.  “With one bound”, said the Financial Times, “Rhône-Poulenc has 
transformed itself from a dull old chemicals producer to a vibrant life sciences 
company.”71  The case for the split was much the same as it had been for ICI: the 
life sciences side was more likely to flourish as a stand-alone company than as 
part of a conglomerate, and the split would enhance shareholder value. But 
Fourtou also recognised that Rhône-Poulenc was a small player in a 
pharmaceutical industry that was rapidly consolidating into the hands of larger 
groups. There had been suggestions that Rhône-Poulenc might merge with Sanofi, 
the second largest French pharmaceutical company, but Fourtou chose instead to 
negotiate a deal with the German company, Hoechst. As noted earlier, the Franco-
German group, Aventis, was established in 1999.   
The French government was not the architect of the Hoechst/Rhône 
Poulenc merger, but it supported the deal, and took steps to ensure that the 
balance of power in the new company was oriented towards France rather than 
Germany.72 Under the terms of the merger Hoechst shareholders would acquire 53 
per cent of the shares in the new company, but the majority of the employees were 
in France – 25,000 out of a total workforce of 95,000, compared to 12,000 in 
Germany – and Aventis was to be a French incorporated company, with its 
headquarters in  Strasbourg. It was in effect France’s national champion in 
pharmaceuticals, and, as subsequent events were to show, the government was 
determined that the company should remain under French control.  
The other big French-owned pharmaceutical firm was Sanofi, which in 
1999 acquired the industry’s third largest player, Synthélabo. In 2004 Sanofi 
made a surprise takeover offer for Aventis. The Anglo-German group resisted the 
bid, and Novartis, the big Swiss pharmaceutical group, indicated that it was 
willing to pay a higher price. The French government made it clear that it was 
opposed to the Novartis proposal because it might lead to a reduction in 
pharmaceutical research in France. Sanofi then increased its offer price; Novartis 
withdrew from the fray; and an even bigger French-controlled pharmaceutical 
giant, Sanofi-Aventis, was born. The head office was moved from Strasbourg to 
Paris. 
                                                
70 L’Expansion, June 13-26, 1996 
71 Financial Times, 27 June 1997. 
72 According to a statement made by Fourtou to a parliamentary committee on March 2nd, 1999, 
the government had been helpful in facilitating tax arrangements (dispositifs fiscaux) which were 
advantageous to the French side in the merger negotiations.    
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 The future of Rhodia, spun off from Rhône-Poulenc in 1998, was of much 
less interest to the government. The demerged company was left to make what it 
could of the disparate portfolio bequeathed to it by its former parent. For the first 
few years after the demerger Rhodia performed poorly, partly because of unwise 
acquisitions. Investors complained that Rhône-Poulenc had used Rhodia as a 
“dumping ground” for its least attractive businesses. 73  After a change of 
management in 2003, the company divested the loss-makers and concentrated on 
a few strong businesses. Two of these were nylon and acetate tow, both of which 
derived from Rhône-Poulenc’s old métier as a man-made fibres producer. 
(Rhône-Poulenc had withdrawn from polyester before the spin-off.) Rhodia’s 
focus in nylon was on the upstream end of the chain and on engineering plastics, 
rather than textile fibre.74 The joint ventures with Snia in Italy were dismantled, 
and some of the French textile fibre operations were sold to private entrepreneurs 
or private equity firms.75 Several of these businesses closed down during the 
economic crisis of 2008-09.76 By 2010 Rhodia had established itself of one of the 
stronger, medium-sized companies in the world chemical industry.77 
Like Akzo Nobel in the Netherlands, from the late 1990s onwards Rhône-
Poulenc pursued a focused strategy in line with the preferences of Anglo-
American investors.78 That it was free to do so reflects the extent to which French 
capitalism had moved away from the statist model – not completely or 
wholeheartedly, as shown by the role played by the government in the 
Aventis/Sanofi affair, but far enough to enable companies such as Rhône-Poulenc 
                                                
73 Business Week, 9 May 2005 
74 Rhodia is one of the world’s two biggest nylon producers, the other being Invista, the ex-
DuPont business bought by Koch Industries in 2004. It is also the third largest producer of acetate 
tow, after Celanese and Eastman in the US.   
75 Rhodia  has a successful nylon business in Brazil, supplying apparel markets and other end-
uses.  
76 The record of private equity firms in the European man-made fibres industry has been mixed. 
CVC made money out of the Acordis acquisition, although the disposal process took longer than 
expected. Some other private equity buyers have successfully restructured the businesses they 
bought, but others paid too high a price for the assets and were forced to close down or find 
another buyer.   
77 In April, 2011, as this article was in press, Rhodia agreed to a friendly takeover offer from a 
larger chemical company, Solvay of Belgium. The deal was justified on the grounds that the 
enlarged group would be less cyclical than the two merging companies and would be better able to 
develop its business in emerging markets. The French government was not expected to object to 
the deal.   
78 Between 1985 and 1997 foreign owners increased their share of stock exchange capitalisation 
from 10 per cent to 35 per cent; by 2000 more than 50 per cent of the shares in several of the 
largest companies were held by foreign investors. François Morin, A transformation of the French 
model of shareholding and management, Economy and Society, 29 (1) 36-53. See also Ben Clift, 
Debating the restructuring of French capitalism and Anglo-Saxon institutional investors: Trojan 
horses or sleeping partners? French Politics 2002, 2: 333-346. 
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 and later Rhodia to adapt to international competition, and to the demands of 
international investors, without interference from the state. This meant, among 
other things, abandoning sectors, such as man-made fibres, which offered little 
prospect of profitable growth.  Some fibre plants continue to operate in France – 
one of the largest survivors is Performance Fibers’ polyester industrial fibre plant 
at Longlaville79 – but the contraction of the industry has been almost as drastic as 
in the UK.  
  
Italy  
  
Italian capitalism has been variously described as familial80 and political.81 The 
first refers to the dominant role played by family-owned or family-controlled 
firms in Italian industry; fewer companies are listed on the stock market than in 
France or Germany, and those that have gone public are generally controlled by a 
dominant investor. The system is also political in the sense that the state or state-
owned entities have had a direct involvement in industry for most of the post-war 
period, and the borderline between private and public sectors has been blurred. 
The post-war history of the Italian man-made fibres industry illustrates these two 
characteristics of the Italian economy 
In the 1950s the leading Italian producer was Snia Viscosa. It had been 
one of the biggest European rayon manufacturers in the inter-war years, and it 
extended its range into synthetics after the war; at that time it ranked as the fifth 
largest Italian company by market capitalisation, not far behind Montecatini, the 
principal Italian chemical company. In the mid-1960s Montecatini merged with 
Edison to form Montedison, and the various fibre-making plants of these two 
companies were brought together in a separate subsidiary, Montefibre. By 1970 
virtually the whole of the Italian man-made fibres industry was in the hands of 
Montefibre and Snia Viscosa.   
On paper Montedison was one of the strongest European chemical 
companies – it was about the same size as ICI – but “the new corporation was a 
conglomerate pursuing a range of different activities, with hundreds of scattered 
plants and firms each with different legal statuses, corporate cultures and 
organisational structures”.82 Rationalisation was impeded by feuding between the 
                                                
79 This was one of the plants bought by the US private equity firm, Sun Capital Partners, from 
Honeywell in 2004; it had been built by Allied Chemical (later part of Honeywell) in the 1970s.   
80  Alexander Aganin and Paolo Volpin, History of corporate governance in Italy, in Randall 
Morck (ed), Corporate governance around the world. 
81 Franco Amatori, Big and small business in Italy’s industrial history, Rivista di Storia Economica 
24 (2) August 2008: 205-223. 
82 Wyn Grant and Alberto Martinelli, Political turbulence, enterprise crisis and industrial recovery: 
ICI and Montedison, in Alberto Martinelli (ed), International markets and global firms, Sage 
1991. 
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 two rival managements, and, to make matters worse, Montedison was soon caught 
up in what came to be known as the “chemical wars”, a struggle for control of the 
chemical industry between state agencies on one side and family groups on the 
other.83   
Before the Montedison merger ENI, the state oil company, through its 
Anic subsidiary, had been building up its chemical interests in opposition to 
Montecatini. After the merger had gone through ENI sought to strengthen its 
position by acquiring a block of Montedison’s shares. Since IRI, the other state 
holding company, already had a stake in the new group, the combined 
government shareholding rose to just under 20 per cent. This marked the start of 
“a tortuous period in which the government tried without the slightest success to 
put the chemical industry on some reasonable track.”84  
In the 1970s Montedison became almost a ward of the state, relying on 
government subsidy to keep its plants in operation. Montefibre, in particular, 
made heavy losses. At the end of the decade the government tried to persuade 
Montedison and Snia to put their fibres businesses into a separate, jointly owned 
company. Agreement was almost reached but negotiations broke down at the last 
moment, apparently because of disagreements about how the new company would 
be managed.   
The two state holding companies sold their shares in Montedison in the 
early 1980s and some degree of stability was restored. A new chief executive, 
Mario Schimberni, sought to establish Montedison as a normal public company, 
free from the control of government or families and run by salaried managers. 
However, another battle for control broke out in 1987, and Montedison acquired a 
new dominant shareholder in the form of a large agro-industrial group, Ferruzzi, 
run by Raul Gardini. In 1989 Gardini put Montefibre, together with some of 
Montedison’s other chemical businesses, into a new company, Enimont, in which 
Montedison and ENI each held a 40 per cent stake. This was to have been Italy’s 
national champion in chemicals but “conflicts between the two shareholders and 
managements rapidly led to a paralysis of the company”.85 Gardini tried to seize 
control of Enimont by buying shares from the outside investors, and, having failed 
in this endeavour, he sold his 40 per cent stake to ENI. Enichem, ENI’s chemical 
subsidiary, was primarily a petrochemical business with no interest in fibres, 
hence the sale of Montefibre to Orlandi, an Italian textile group. 
                                                
83 Francesca Fauri, The “economic miracle” and Italy’s chemical industry: 1950-1965: a missed 
opportunity, Enterprise and Society, June 2000 279-313.  
84  Vera Zamagni, The rise and fall of the Italian chemical industry, 1950s-1990s, in Louis 
Galambos, Takashi Hikino and Vera Zamagni (eds), The global chemical industry in the age of the 
petrochemical revolution, Cambridge 2007. 
85 Luciano Segreto, Italian capitalism between the private and public sectors, 1933-1994, Business 
and Economic History, 27 (2) Winter 1998:455-468.  
45
Owen: Corporate Strategy and National Institutions
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
 Snia Viscosa had been on the edge of the chemical wars, and it, too, was 
badly affected by government intervention. Like AKU in the Netherlands, it had 
reduced its dependence on fibres in 1969 by merging with another Italian group, 
Bombrini-Parodi-Deflini, which was mainly a supplier of defence equipment but 
also had a stake in fibres and chemicals. Fibres represented some 40 per cent of 
the merged group, and in common with the rest of the European industry this 
division suffered badly during the over-capacity crisis of the 1970s. It made heavy 
losses and would not have survived without financial assistance from the state.  
 At the end of the decade Snia was reorganised as a holding company, 
with Snia Fibre as one of several semi-autonomous units, and financial 
performance gradually improved. By 1983 Snia was sufficiently attractive for Fiat, 
then in the process of diversifying away from the motor industry, to acquire a 
controlling stake. The most valuable component of the group was Sorin, a 
biomedical business, but Snia Fibre, accounting for about a third of sales, made 
satisfactory profits for most of the 1980s. Its main strength was in nylon, and in 
1990 this side of the company was enlarged by an agreement with Montefibre, 
whereby Snia sold its polyester and acrylic plants to Montefibre in exchange for 
the latter’s nylon and cellulosics businesses. Three years later Snia strengthened 
its position in nylon by setting up joint ventures with Rhône-Poulenc, principally 
in textile fibre. 
By the mid-1990s Fiat, the controlling shareholder, had changed its 
strategy and was seeking to dispose of its non-automotive interests. In 1998, after 
a failed attempt to sell Snia to another industrial group, it floated the shares on the 
Milan stock exchange. Snia now had three main divisions - fibres, bioengineering 
and speciality chemicals – and the chairman, Umberto Rosa, planned to develop 
the group on these three legs. Sorin, the bioengineering firm, was the most 
profitable of the three, and would be more highly valued if it was an independent 
quoted company; it was demerged in 2003. Meanwhile, with the continuing 
decline of the European textile industry the fibres business was starting to lose 
money. The Nylstar joint venture had not been well managed, partly because 
disagreements between the two partners slowed down the rationalisation that was 
needed. Snia tried to sell its half-share to Rhône-Poulenc, but the French company 
had no wish to increase its investment in textile fibres. Finally, in 2007, Nylstar 
was put into administration. This left Snia with a speciality chemicals business 
and some property interests. In 2010 Snia went into bankruptcy.  
Virtually nothing was left of what had been two of the largest European 
man-made fibre producers. Most of the ex-Snia plants were closed down. As for 
Montefibre, the acquisition by Orlandi did not work out well. The big acrylic fibre 
plant at Porto Marghera was closed down in 2009, and the Acerra polyester plant 
was also operating far below capacity. Yet in Italy – and here there is a notable 
contrast with the UK  – the decline of the two former leaders was partially offset 
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 by the rise of a new group of fibre manufacturers, some of them closely linked to 
the textile industry. More tightly managed and more flexible than the former 
incumbents, these family-owned companies were better equipped to withstand the 
competitive conditions now prevailing in the market. Led by Radici and Aquafil, 
they belonged to a group of medium-sized, privately owned companies that 
formed part of what has been called Italy’s “fourth capitalism”, separate from 
giant groups like Fiat, state-owned enterprises like ENI, and the very small firms 
for which Italy is famous.86 They kept well away from the state, and from the 
stock market. 
If the decline of Montedison and Snia can be ascribed to a combination of 
poor management and distinctively Italian institutional weaknesses, the survival 
of a relatively healthy man-made fibres industry, the second largest in Western 
Europe after Germany, was made possible by a different sort of company, one 
that seems better fitted for the Italian environment.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Of the fifteen companies listed in Table 3, eight continued to exist in 2010 in a 
form recognisably similar to what they were at the end of the 1970s, albeit in most 
cases with a different mix of businesses (Table 9). Five had ceased to exist, 
although some of their businesses were still functioning under different owners. 
Monsanto, Solutia and Rhodia were in an intermediate category, since they were 
spin-offs from their former parents.  
These different outcomes can be looked at in terms of corporate strategy: 
how companies responded to the decline of one of their core businesses, how they 
handled acquisitions and divestments, how well or badly they reshaped their 
portfolios. Some firms made bad mistakes and suffered as a result. It is also clear 
from the events described in this article that a company’s fortunes can be 
influenced decisively by the actions of individual executives. Hoechst would 
probably not have been broken up, at least not at that time or in that form, had not 
Jürgen Dormann become chief executive in 1994. Lenzing might not have 
become the world leader in cellulosic fibres without the leadership at a critical 
period of Thomas Fahnemann. But national policies and institutions are also 
relevant to an understanding of why some companies survived and others did not.  
                                                
86 Amatori, Big and small business in Italy’s industrial history.  
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  Table 9. Survivors, non-survivors and spin-offs 
 
Survivors   Non-survivors   Spin-offs 
 
Lenzing   Hoechst    Monsanto, Solutia* 
Toray    ICI     Rhodia+ 
Teijin    Courtaulds 
Asahi Kasei     Montedison 
DuPont   Snia Viscosa 
Celanese 
Bayer 
Akzo Nobel 
 
*Solutia is a speciality chemical company no longer involved in fibres; it withdrew from acrylic 
fibres in 2005 and sold its nylon business in 2009  
+In 2011 Rhodia merged with Solvay of Belgium  
 
The main differentiating factor among the countries discussed in this 
article has been the extent to which they relied on markets, especially financial 
markets, as the principal driver of industrial and corporate change. The clearest 
contrast is between Japan, where the reorganisation of the industry was largely 
carried out within the existing fibre manufacturers, and the US and the UK, where 
the adjustment process involved numerous divestments, break-ups and changes of 
ownership. Some of the Continental countries have moved towards the Anglo-
American model in recent years while others remain wedded to a system closer to 
that of Japan. 
Which system is best? Should countries that have partially embraced the 
Anglo-American model go further in that direction, and how likely is it that they 
will do so?  
Two American academics have argued that the shift in the character of US 
financial markets that began in the 1980s – more shareholder activism, more 
hostile takeovers, more use of share-based remuneration – has been hugely 
beneficial for the US economy. “The potential for improved corporate 
performance paired with empowered investors gave birth to takeovers, junk bonds 
and LBOs. In some cases the capital markets reversed ill-advised diversification; 
in others, the capital markets helped to eliminate excess capacity; in others, the 
capital markets disciplined managers who had ignored shareholders to benefit 
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 other stakeholders.”87 According to this view, markets are more effective than 
corporations in moving capital from declining to growing industries. Established 
companies are difficult to rely upon as the mechanisms for economic restructuring, 
since managers will always seek to protect their own interests (and those of their 
employees) rather than those of shareholders. This results in “costly delays, 
distorted investment decisions and misguided efforts to save jobs.”88  
The opposing argument is that the preoccupation with shareholder value as 
the sole measure of performance, and the existence of an active market for 
corporate control, can lead to the loss of assets and capabilities which, given 
greater patience on the part of owners, can have long-term value for the country’s 
economy. Projects which fail to meet short-term profit targets are abandoned too 
quickly; sound companies which run into temporary crises are gobbled up by 
predators instead of being nursed back to health.  
Advocates of the “long-termist” approach might point to carbon fibre to 
support their argument. This high-strength material – hailed when it was 
introduced in the 1960s as “stronger than steel, lighter than aluminium” - was 
taken up by several companies in Japan, Europe and the US; they were mostly 
manufacturers of acrylic fibre, which was the preferred precursor for the carbon 
fibre manufacturing process. Courtaulds was one of the early leaders, alongside 
several Japanese companies led by Toray, and US firms such as Celanese and 
Union Carbide.  
The market for carbon fibre was harder to develop than the manufacturers 
had expected and few of them made much money in the early years, but by the 
1980s the US defence industry had become an important customer, and several 
companies built new capacity in the expectation that demand from this source 
would continue to grow. Then came the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the 
Cold War, leading to a sharp cutback in orders from the US Defense Department. 
Virtually all the European and American companies, including Courtaulds, pulled 
out. The Japanese firms, by contrast, continued to invest in carbon fibre and to 
search for new applications, even when profits were low. Thus when the market 
recovered towards the end of the 1990s, they were well placed to dominate the 
industry and they have continued to do so. As volumes have increased and the 
price has come down, carbon fibre is finding applications in a wide range of 
products, including cars. 
If shareholder pressure had been as strong in Japan in the early 1990s as it 
was in the US and the UK, the carbon fibre story might have had a different 
outcome.  As one Japanese executive has remarked, “The major Western 
                                                
87 Bengt Holmstrom and Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate governance and merger activity in the US: 
making sense of the 1980s and 1990s, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 
8220, April 2001. 
88 Holmstrom and Kaplan, Corporate governance and merger activity in the US. 
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 companies do not mind a bold attempt when starting a new business, and at the 
same time they pull out of the market when it does not go well. Carbon fibre 
requires a long time in developing the technology and the market. Its market is 
not huge, and demand is not consistent. Therefore, Western-style management 
might not be suitable for this product development.”89   
For Courtaulds, withdrawal from carbon fibre was especially 
disappointing because it had been seen as one of the company’s few high-growth 
businesses. There is some similarity with Courtaulds’ experience with Tencel. 
This was the new cellulosic fibre which seemed in the mid-1990s as if it might 
enable Courtaulds to re-establish a position of leadership in man-made fibres. But 
it took longer for Tencel to generate profits than the company had expected, and 
this was one of the reasons why Courtaulds became vulnerable to takeover. It was 
a “long-termist”, stakeholder-oriented company, Lenzing, which later took control 
of the Tencel operation and made a success of it. 
Courtaulds had made mistakes in the 1960s and 1970s – most obviously 
its plunge into textiles and clothing - and some of those mistakes were difficult to 
recover from. In the British system shareholders punish mistakes of this kind, and 
the punishment may take the form of takeover and break-up. Whether this is good 
or bad for the economy depends in part on what happens to the assets after the 
takeover. In the Courtaulds case the best part of the company was the paints 
division, and that now belongs to Akzo Nobel, which has continued to invest in 
the ex-Courtaulds plants. In fibres, Tencel was the British company’s most 
valuable asset, and the Grimsby plant continues to operate under Lenzing’s 
ownership, although the development activity has been transferred to Austria. The 
takeover in 1998 may be said to have unblocked a dysfunctional corporate 
structure, divided as it was between fibres and paints, and ensured that the good 
assets passed into the hands of appropriate owners.   
ICI is a different story because its strongest division, pharmaceuticals, was 
hived off into Zeneca in 1993, and that company, now AstraZeneca, has 
continued to flourish as one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical firms. (If 
Zeneca had been given the ICI name, as might have happened at the time of the 
demerger, the “ICI story” would look rather different.)  However, the hope at the 
time of the demerger was that the new ICI, without pharmaceuticals, would hold 
its position as a major international chemical company. That it failed to do so was 
                                                
89 In 1997 Keizo Kanegae, president of Toho Rayon from 1983 to 1990, wrote a ’Study of the 
historical development of PAN-based carbon fibres’, from which this quotation is taken. This was 
an internal document made available to the author by Toho Rayon. For an account of the evolution 
of the carbon fibre industry see Graham Spinardi, Industrial exploitation of carbon fibre in the UK, 
USA and Japan, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 14 (2) 2002:381-398; Celia A. 
Russell, International competition in the advanced materials sector: the case of carbon fibre, 
Unpublished PhD thesis, Manchester University 1996. 
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 due to mistakes made over the subsequent decade. But here, too, the consequence 
of the takeover by Akzo Nobel was that ICI’s best business, paints, passed into 
the hands of an appropriate owner who would continue to invest in it   
The demise of Courtaulds and ICI was the cause of much hand-wringing 
in the British press. A common view is that the UK has too few companies that 
are world leaders in their industries; these two takeovers seemed to provide 
further evidence of British industrial decline. It is true that if ICI or Courtaulds 
had played their cards differently one of them might have ended up as the world’s 
leading paints manufacturer. Instead that accolade went to Akzo Nobel. But how 
much does this matter? Has the British economy been damaged because ICI and 
Courtaulds no longer exist?  
Of the European countries discussed in this article the UK has had the 
most open policy towards inward investment, whether in the form of new 
factories or takeovers of British companies. Foreign companies now own large 
parts of the British chemical industry, including man-made fibres, and the same 
applies to other industries such as engineering and electronics. Whether this 
transfer of ownership is good or bad for the British economy has become a 
political issue in the UK; some commentators believe that the British financial 
system allows viable companies to be taken over too easily.90  
ICI is important in this debate since for most of the post-war period it 
ranked among the world’s six leading chemical groups, alongside Dow and 
DuPont in the US and the three big German companies. The only British chemical 
company in the top ten in 2010 was the privately owned INEOS, which had been 
put together over the previous decade by a British entrepreneur, Jim Ratcliffe, 
through the purchase of unwanted businesses from the established chemical 
groups. In 2000, for example, he acquired ICI’s chlor-alkali business in the north 
west of England; five years later, in a much bigger deal, he bought BP’s 
petrochemical interests for $9 billion. INEOS is mainly a commodity chemical 
producer; it makes no claim to be a research-based company. Like Charles Koch 
in the US, who bought Invista from DuPont, Ratcliffe believed that he could make 
money out of commodity chemicals as long as they were managed with a 
relentless focus on low costs, and that they were more likely to prosper under 
private ownership than as part of a listed company. INEOS was a product of the 
Anglo-American financial system; it could not have happened in Germany or 
Japan. 
                                                
90 When Cadbury was taken over by Kraft (of the US) in 2010, there was widespread concern in 
the UK about the apparent ease with which major British companies could be bought by foreign 
acquirers. Ministers in the new Conservative/Liberal Democrat government commissioned an 
inquiry into whether excessive “short-termism” on the part of investors was damaging the British 
economy. One of the issues was whether the rules governing takeovers were too heavily weighted 
in favour of the bidder.    
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 The market-based system has its drawbacks. Managers and investors may 
be over-influenced by short-term movements in the share price and neglect 
investments that will only pay off in the long term. Companies may sell or close 
poorly performing businesses too quickly, when with greater patience they could 
be nursed back to health. They may be tempted to make dramatic moves – for 
example, a large acquisition – in an attempt to impress their shareholders. Many 
takeovers end in disappointment for the acquiring company; the only gainers tend 
to be the shareholders in the company being taken over. 
  Moreover it is hard to deny that something is lost when companies such 
as ICI and Courtaulds disappear; continuity does have some value. In the case of 
ICI, even though the larger part of its research and development activity passed to 
Zeneca, there was a sizeable research effort on the non-pharmaceutical side of the 
company (and those resources were dissipated). Courtaulds was not a research-
based company like ICI, and not as important as an employer and exporter, but it 
had long been in the front rank of British industry and had some notable 
achievements to its credit, from the commercialisation of rayon in the early years 
of the twentieth century to the development of a world-class paints business in the 
1970s and 1980s.  
On the other hand, the financial system that prevails in the US and the UK 
gives these two economies a flexibility that is lacking in countries where the stock 
market plays a smaller role. The clear line of accountability between managers 
and shareholders ensures that companies do not cling to businesses which have 
little economic value or which would do better under different owners. Well-
organised financial markets make funds available for entrepreneurs such as 
Charles Koch and Jim Ratcliffe, and for private equity firms. If one of the 
consequences of the system is that potentially valuable projects are abandoned too 
early, and that potentially viable companies are broken up too easily, that is seen 
as a price worth paying. To protect long-established companies, either by making 
takeovers more difficult or by protecting them in other ways, is a recipe for 
slowing down industrial change. This is now recognised by countries such as 
Germany and Japan, which have traditionally been suspicious of the Anglo-
American system. Their companies are now more responsive to shareholder 
demands. But they still have a different view of what companies are for, and this 
will continue to affect the way they respond to industrial change. 
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